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 This dissertation is the collection of three papers that each examines a specific labor 
impact of the enforcement of the Clean Water Act. The chapters of the dissertation all use panel 
data from a unique survey of chemical manufacturing facilities operating between 1999 and 2001 
to empirically examine how environmental enforcement policy affects the use of employees at 
regulated firms, specifically those employees whose job functions pertain to environmental 
management. 
The first chapter explores the effects of enforcement on the amount of environmental 
labor employed by facilities regulated under the U.S. Clean Water Act. Specifically, the analysis 
examines the influence of monitoring inspections and enforcement actions, e.g., fines, on the 
number of employees allocated to environmental management. Empirical results show that 
environmental enforcement negatively affects the amount of environmental labor allocated by 
the sampled facilities. Specifically, federal inspections, informal enforcement actions, and 
monetary fines each negatively affect environmental employment. 
The second chapter adds to the first by examining the influence of the overall 
environmental enforcement approach, contrasting a potentially innovative cooperative approach 
with the standard coercive approach, on the effects of government interventions on corporate 
environmental management, specifically environmental employment. The results show that the 
effectiveness of enforcement at inducing better environmental management depends on the 
overall regulatory enforcement approach. Controlling for various facility-level characteristics, I 
find that greater cooperation undermines enforcement effectiveness. As one example, monetary 
penalties positively affect the amount of environmental labor under a sufficiently coercive 
approach, yet negatively under a sufficiently cooperative approach. These results show that a 
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cooperative enforcement approach is ineffective at best and counter-productive at worst, while a 
coercive approach is generally effective. Rather than cooperation representing an innovative 
policy, cooperation may simply reflect regulatory capture. 
The third chapter examines the overall employment effects of environmental 
enforcement. To generate contributions, the study assesses various forms of enforcement, which 
include both government monitoring inspections and actual enforcement actions. The study first 
estimates effects of government interventions on total employment, consistent with previous 
empirical studies. Then the study jointly estimates a system of two equations – one for 
environmental labor and one for production labor – to identify the different effects of 
government interventions on environmental workers and production workers. Overall, the 
empirical results reveal that government interventions have a zero or negative effect on total 
employment. More important, the empirical results generally demonstrate that government 
interventions have a zero or positive effect on environmental employment, yet a zero or negative 
effect on production employment, consistent with the constructed theoretical framework. Thus, 
all previous labor studies, which examine only total employment, most likely generate results 
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1 The Effects of Clean Water Act Enforcement on Environmental 
Employment 
1.1 Introduction 
This paper examines the effectiveness of government interventions at inducing 
compliance through the use of environmental labor. Within the economic literature, a number of 
studies empirically examine the effectiveness of interventions (e.g., inspections, warning letters, 
fines) at inducing compliance with environmental laws. These studies examine a wide range of 
environmental media (e.g., air, water, hazardous waste) and economic sectors (Gray and Deily, 
1996; Laplante and Rilstone, 1996; Helland, 1998a; Helland, 1998b; Earnhart, 2004a; Earnhart, 
2004b). 
Labor is an important part of any facility’s operations. Similarly, environmentally related 
labor is a key component of a facility’s environmental management operations. As one 
dimension, most regulated facilities operate some sort of discharge treatment equipment 
demanding at least one environmental employee with proper training. As evidence, within the 
sample of facilities examined in this study, the presence of environmental labor is considerable: 
4.6 % of the average facility’s workforce specializes in environmental management.
1
 Thus, 
facilities invest a significant amount of their person power into environmental management. 
Additionally, environmentally related labor is effective at lowering facility discharges (i.e., 
inducing compliance) in the chemical manufacturing sector (Earnhart and Glicksman, 2011). 




 This value is higher than the value of 1 % provided by the Census Pollution Abatement Controls 
and Expenditures (PACE) survey for the chemical manufacturing sector.  This contrast is expected since 




Analysis on the impact of environmental enforcement on labor also carries political 
implications. In today's political environment, where environmental regulations and efforts to 
reduce pollution are considered detrimental to employment, the study’s assessment of 
environmental employees is especially important. While enforcement might reduce employment 
in general operations, enforcement might actually spur greater environmental employment 
(Morgenstern et al., 2002). 
The absence of analysis on environmental employees appears to stem directly from a lack 
of available data. As the nearest efforts, the Department of Commerce and the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) have attempted to quantify this type of labor in the "Measuring the Green 
Economy Report" (Department of Commerce, 2010) and the “Employment in Green Goods and 
Services” report (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011), respectively. Both reports simply estimate 
the number of environmental jobs. The Department of Commerce uses an “output” approach, 
where environmental employment is calculated as a fraction of total employment based on how 
much output is considered “green.” The BLS, on the other hand, uses a “process” approach, 
which calculates environmental employment based on the production process used, even if the 
output is not considered “green.” Using this approach, the BLS estimates 24,733 environmental 
employees were working in the chemical manufacturing sector as of 2011. While these estimates 
are useful for aggregate analysis, this study claims that the data used here are superior to these 
estimates. This study’s data were collected through a survey of chemical manufacturing facilities 
that captured the count of employees responsible for managing wastewater discharges, which 
were regulated by Clean Water Act permits. Thus, these data on environmental employees relate 
directly to regulatory compliance and, by extension, government inspections and enforcement 
actions designed to induce compliance (i.e., deter non-compliance). 
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My assessment of environmental labor allocation is the first study to examine this 
specific environmental management component. Instead, previous studies focus on other types of 
environmental management: implementation of an environmental management system [EMS] 
(Johnstone and Labonne, 2009), certification of an EMS (Christman and Taylor, 2001; Arimura 
et al., 2008; Dasgupta et al., 2000; Henriques and Sadorsky, 2007; and Delmas and Toffel, 
2008), environmental self-audits (Earnhart and Leonard, 2013; Evans et al., 2011), and various 
other management forms (Garcia et al., 2009). Closer to this study, Greenstone (2002), Berman 
and Bui (2001), Gray et al. (2014), and Ferris et al. (2014) examine the impact of government 
regulations on employment, but do not specifically assess environmental employment. These 
studies examine the impacts of the imposition of various environmental regulations on total 




As its second contribution, this study focuses on the labor impacts of the enforcement of 
regulations. Previous studies focus on the imposition of regulations, while ignoring the 
enforcement element (Walker, 2011; Greenstone, 2002; Berman and Bui, 2001; Gray et al., 
2014; Ferris et al., 2014). 
This study proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides a literature review on environmental 
enforcement, environmental management, and the labor impacts of environmental regulation. 
Section 1.3 describes the relevant regulatory context. Section 1.4 discusses the econometric 




 Using survey data, this study is able to assess this same effect on total employment, but the 
identified studies cannot assess the effect on environmental employment since the publicly available 
microdata do not distinguish between environmental and other employment. 
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framework. Section 1.5 provides a discussion of the data. Section 1.6 details the econometric 
analysis and interprets its results. Finally, Section 1.7 provides conclusions. 
1.2 Literature Review 
 This section reviews the literature relating to environmental enforcement, management, 
and labor. 
1.2.1 Public Enforcement of Environmental Laws 
Becker (1968) offers the modern theoretical foundation for the public enforcement of 
environmental laws. Based on this foundation, the standard deterrence model posits that an 
enforcement agency monitors the compliance of regulated facilities and deters non-compliance 
by imposing sanctions in response to violations. Since this foundational work, a number of 
studies have expanded the standard model of deterrence; Polinsky and Shovell (2000) provide a 
thorough review of this literature. 
Nearly all previous empirical studies explore this standard deterrence model by 
examining the effect of environmental enforcement on facility-level or firm-level environmental 
performance or management (e.g., Gray and Shadbegian, 2004; Shimshack and Ward, 2005; 
Gray and Deily, 1996; Laplante and Rhilstone, 1996; Earnhart, 2004a; Earnhart, 2004b; Earnhart 
and Leonard, 2013). Gray and Shimshack (2011) provide a comprehensive review of this 
empirical literature. 
1.2.2 Environmental Management 
This study analyzes the effect of enforcement, broadly interpreted to include all types of 
government interventions (including regulatory inspections), on the use of environmental labor 
by facilities regulated under the Clean Water Act. The use of environmental labor as the 
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dependent variable sits within a larger literature exploring regulated facilities’ environmental 
management, interpreted to include any method used by facilities to control pollution. 
The first group of studies examines environmental management broadly by exploring 
facilities’ decisions to establish and operate an environmental management system (EMS). In 
some cases, facilities decide to obtain certification of their EMSs based on commercial 
standards, such as ISO 14001 certification. Several empirical studies explore facilities' adoption 
of ISO 14001-certified EMSs (Christmann and Taylor, 2001; Arimura et al., 2008; Nakamura et 
al., 2001; Dasgupta et al., 2000; Henriques and Sadorsky, 2007; Delmas and Toffel, 2008; Mori 
and Welch, 2008). 
The second group of studies analyzes specific types of environmental management, much 
like the present study. Some studies examine companies’ decisions to undertake various 
environmental management and/or pollution prevention practices by summing across the 
practices (Khanna and Anton, 2002; Anton et al., 2004; Harrington et al., 2008). Other studies 
analyze companies' decisions to administer specific environmental management and pollution 
prevention practices (Khanna et al. (2007; Jones, 2010; Ervin et al., 2012; Garcia et al., 2009; 
Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996). Finally, some studies focus on one specific environmental 
management practice: environmental self-audits (Earnhart and Leonard, 2013; Evans et al., 2011; 
Earnhart and Harrington, 2014). 
1.2.3 Labor Impacts of Environmental Regulation 
 Within the economic literature, there are a number of studies that examine the labor 
impacts of environmental regulation. First, Walker (2011) finds that firms respond to regulatory 
pressure by eliminating jobs, not necessarily changing their hiring practices. Second, Greenstone 
(2002) shows that the Clean Air Act’s designation of counties as either in attainment or out of 
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attainment has significant labor impacts in multiple manufacturing sectors; manufacturers 
operating in non-attainment counties lose significantly more employees in comparison to 
manufacturers operating in attainment counties. Third, Berman and Bui (2001) examine the 
stringency of air quality regulation in the Los Angeles area. The authors find that regulatory 
stringency has no significant employment effects. Fourth, Gray et al. (2014) study the impacts of 
the Cluster Rule on the number of jobs in the pulp and paper industry. The authors find minimal 
effects on the number of employees at facilities subject to the rule. Finally, Ferris et al. (2014) 
find that Phase I of the Title IV SO2 trading program had negligible effects on employment at 
fossil fuel-fired plants. 
1.2.4 Contributions of Present Study 
This study contributes to these literatures in two ways. First, this study examines a 
previously ignored, yet highly important, form of environmental management: the amount of 
labor dedicated to environmental management. Second, this study is the first to examine the 
effects on employment from the enforcement of environmental regulations rather than the 
imposition of regulations. 
1.3 Regulatory Context 
 This section describes the regulatory context relevant to the analysis. 
1.3.1 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
This study examines environmental behavior relating to the U.S. Clean Water Act. One 
of the Act’s main purposes is protecting water quality by controlling wastewater discharges from 
point sources. To this end, the EPA created the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) to control these point source discharges. The system’s main form of control is the 
issuance of facility-specific permits, which identify the pollutant-specific discharge limits 
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imposed on regulated facilities.
3
 Permits are issued and re-issued generally on a 5-year cycle by 
the EPA or authorized state agencies.
4
 
When establishing discharge limits within individual facilities’ permits, the issuing 
agency considers the relevant Effluent Limitation Guideline standard, which is designed to 
require a minimum level of wastewater treatment for a given industry, and the state water 
quality-based standard, which is designed to ensure that the water body receiving the discharges 
meets state-based ambient surface water quality standards. After a candidate discharge limit is 
determined under each standard, the more stringent limit is written into the permit. 
Each permitted discharge limit represents a performance-based standard under which 
compliance is based solely on one's own discharges. Thus, a facility may use any available 
abatement method to comply with its permitted limits. A myriad of abatement methods are 
available to facilities: end-of-pipe treatment technologies (i.e., capital), deployment of labor, and 
other methods. Clearly the deployment of labor enhances the effectiveness of equipment and 
other methods. For example, wastewater engineers monitor the operation of treatment 
technologies. 
In the NPDES system, permitted facilities are required to monitor and self-report their 
discharges on a regular basis. Thus, inspections are not needed to assess compliance with 
imposed discharge limits. 




 The EPA website provides an overview of the NPDES permitting system: 
http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/npdes/basics/upload/101pape.pdf. 
4
 In order to obtain approval for NPDES authority, a state agency must demonstrate the regulatory 




To ensure compliance with issued permits, the EPA and authorized state agencies 
periodically inspect facilities and take enforcement actions as needed. Agencies possess great 
discretion over monitoring and enforcement decisions. While the EPA retains authority to 
monitor and impose sanctions on facilities, authorized state agencies are primarily responsible 
for monitoring and enforcement. Inspections represent the back bone of environmental agencies’ 
efforts to monitor compliance and collect evidence for enforcement (Wasserman, 1984); 
inspections also maintain a regulatory presence (EPA, 1990). For enforcement, agencies use a 
mixture of informal enforcement actions (e.g., warning letters) and formal enforcement actions, 
which include penalties (i.e., fines). 
Figure 1.1 displays the structure of environmental agencies and other entities involved in 
environmental enforcement. Lower-level personnel at the EPA and state agencies possess broad 
discretion over inspection decisions: who to inspect and when. Similarly, lower-level agency 
personnel possess broad discretion over decisions to take informal enforcement actions such as 
issuing "Notices of Violation" and warning letters: against which facilities to take enforcement 
actions and when. Both inspections and informal enforcement actions represent day-to-day 
activities conducted without much upper-level guidance. 
Lawyers at environmental agencies are responsible for prosecuting enforcement cases 
before administrative judges or forwarding cases to the Department of Justice (DOJ) with a 
request for prosecution before civil judges. For example, lawyers at EPA regional offices may 
initiate an administrative proceeding in order to impose an administrative sanction, or may 
request that the DOJ initiate a civil court proceeding in order to impose a civil sanction on 
facilities that are seriously non-compliant. These lawyers operate with much discretion and 
without guidance from upper-level administrators. Importantly, in the EPA and presumably all 
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state agencies, a firewall separates top administrators from enforcement cases in order to avoid 
even the impression of political influence. 
Once agency or DOJ lawyers initiate enforcement proceedings, administrative or civil 
judges decide on the imposition of the formal sanctions. 
The federal and state agencies hope that monitoring inspections and enforcement actions 
generate both specific and general deterrence. Specific deterrence prompts the particular facility 
inspected or enforced against to improve its subsequent compliance, while general deterrence 
prompts other facilities to improve their subsequent compliance (Cohen, 2000); both forms of 
deterrence are explained further in Section 1.5. 
1.3.2 Chemical Manufacturing Sector 
The Clean Water Act principally constrains wastewater discharges from point sources, 
which divide into two categories: municipal sources (i.e., municipal wastewater treatment 
facilities) and industrial sources.
5
 This study focuses on a single sector within the category of 
industrial sources: chemical manufacturing facilities. This study’s focus on a single sector is 
consistent with other empirical studies of industrial pollution (e.g., Laplante and Rilstone, 1996; 
Barla, 2007; Earnhart, 2009; Earnhart and Harrington, 2014). 
The chemical manufacturing sector proves an excellent choice for analyzing the effect of 
government interventions on environmental labor. First, the EPA has shown a strong interest in 
this sector as evidenced by its study, jointly authored with the Chemical Manufacturing 
Association (CMA), on the root causes of non-compliance in this sector (EPA, 1999) and its own 








study on the compliance history for chemical manufacturers (EPA, 1997). Consistent with this 
interest, two sub-sectors in the industry, industrial organics and chemical preparations, were 
regarded by the EPA as priority sectors during a portion of the study period. Further, the CMA 
(now known as the American Chemistry Council [ACC]) has demonstrated a strong interest in 
promoting pollution reduction and prevention with its Responsible Care initiative. The chemical 
manufacturing sector also generates a large amount of wastewater; as evidence, data on 
wastewater discharged in 2008 that are disaggregated by 4-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code reveal that four of the 10 most polluting sub-sectors operate in the 
chemical manufacturing sector (EPA, 2011). Finally, this sector has a significant amount of labor 
devoted to environmental management. The average facility in the sample employs 75 employee 
person-months devoted specifically to environmental management (or roughly 6.25 full-time 
equivalent (FTE) employees). As important, according to BLS estimates, the chemical 
manufacturing sector has a total of 24,733 environmental workers employed, roughly 5% of the 
total green employment in the manufacturing industry, making the chemical manufacturing 
sector the most “green” employer of all aggregated sectors (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011).  
All these points notwithstanding, this study acknowledges that the results from a study of the 
chemical manufacturing industry may not generalize to other industrial sectors. 
1.4 Data 
 This section describes the data used for the empirical analysis and discusses variation in 
the dependent variable. 
1.4.1 Sources 
This study gathers information from three main data sources to perform the empirical 
analysis. First, the study uses an original survey of facilities regulated under the National 
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Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program and operating in the chemical 
manufacturing industry; see Earnhart and Glicksman (2011) for details. The survey consists of a 
number of confidential questions that gather data on environmental management practices 
undertaken by individual facilities. Most importantly, the survey gathers data on the count of 
individuals employed at the facility whose primary job-related activities relate to environmental 
management.
6
 The survey contains data for the years 1999, 2000, and 2001. In addition to 
environmental management practices, the survey also gathered information on facility 
characteristics (e.g., facility age) and characteristics of the firms that owned the facilities (e.g., 
ownership structure). 
To implement the survey, Earnhart and Glicksman (2011) and collaborators identified the 
proper population based on a full extract drawn from the EPA Permit Compliance System (PCS) 
database, which records information on facilities permitted within the NPDES system, as of 
September, 2001. This extract includes 2,596 chemical facilities. To remain in the survey 
population, facilities needed to meet the following criteria: (1) possessed an NPDES permit, (2) 
faced restrictions on their wastewater discharges, (3) discharged regulated pollutants into surface 
water bodies, and (4) were operating as of 2002. Application of these criteria identified 1,003 
facilities to contact. Of those facilities contacted between April of 2002 and March of 2003, 268 




 This count is measured in employee person-month equivalent form. Given this unit of 





facilities completed at least 90 %
7
 of the survey, implying a 27 % response rate. This rate is 
comparable to previous large-scale surveys of industrial sectors (e.g., Arimura et al., 2008) and 
lies above the average response rate of 21 % as identified by a review of 183 published studies 
based on business surveys (Paxson, 1992).  
To complement these survey data, this study also collected data from the EPA PCS 
database on each facility's (1) location, (2) NPDES major or minor classification, and (3) four-
digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code. The PCS database also provides data on 
inspections conducted by federal and state regulators. Both the PCS database and the EPA 
Docket database provide data on federal formal enforcement actions, while only the PCS 
database provides data on informal enforcement actions. This study integrates these two 
databases. 
1.4.2 Statistical Summary of the Dependent Variable 
Table 1.1 shows the sample summary statistics of the dependent variable, primary 
regressors, and control factors. Most important, the average facility has roughly 75 individual-
level person-months devoted specifically to environmental management issues.
8
 The distribution 
of the environmental employee count is not normally distributed. After log-transformation, the 
distribution of the environmental employee appears normally distributed, as shown in Figure 1.2. 




 The survey includes responses from 268 facilities reflecting three years of environmental 
management, resulting in 804 possible observations. Since some survey questions were not answered by 
all respondents; the regression sample contains 709 observations, as shown in Table 1.2. I conduct a 
sample means test on all non-survey regressors between the regression sample and the observations 
excluded from the regression sample. The test statistics reveal no significant differences between these 
two sub-samples. 
8
 To transform this value to the number of FTE employees, simply divide person-months by 12. 
Therefore, this value represents 6.25 FTE employees devoted to environmental management. 
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To assess the temporal variation in the count of environmental employees, this study 
explores the intra-facility variation in the dependent variable for the three years of data used in 
the analysis. For this assessment, the study calculates the standard deviation of each facility’s 
count of environmental employees over the sample period and then generates summary statistics 
for this distribution. Based on the set of facility-specific values, the average facility-specific 
standard deviation is 5.25 and the standard deviation for the distribution of facility-specific 
values is 20.82. These two values reveal a coefficient of variation of 3.97. These statistics 
demonstrate considerable variation in the number of environmental employees within individual 
facilities over the sample period. 
Table 1.1 also summarizes the primary regressors and control factors, which the next 
section describes. 
1.5 Econometric Framework 
This section builds an econometric framework for estimating the effects of government 
interventions on environmental employment. 
1.5.1 Dependent Variable and Primary Regressors 
In each year t, facility i chooses its level of environmental management, denoted as Yit, 
which represents the number of facility-level person-months for employees dedicated to 
environmental management. The primary regressors of the analysis are government 












These primary regressors, which the study uses as measures of environmental 
enforcement, are expected to impact environmental labor in one of two ways. First, previous 
studies show that environmental management increases compliance with NPDES discharge 
limits (e.g., Earnhart and Harrington, 2014). Since facilities at least partially implement 
environmental management practices to comply with their NPDES limits, government 
interventions, which are designed to induce compliance, should increase the use of 
environmental management. This analysis examines one form of environmental management - 
environmental labor. Therefore, one should expect that government interventions used to induce 
compliance would increase the employment of environmental labor, which effectively improves 
compliance (Earnhart and Glicksman, 2011). However, environmental management in the form 
of environmental labor, at its heart, represents an employment outcome. The economic literature, 
as outlined in Section 1.2.3, shows that the majority of environmental regulations have either a 
negative impact on employment outcomes (Walker, 2011; Greenstone, 2002), or no impact on 
employment outcomes (Ferris, et al., 2014, Gray, et al., 2014). Therefore, since this study 
examines an employment outcome of environmental regulation, one can expect that the impact 
of enforcement may be negative or non-existent. Overall, the impact of environmental 
enforcement on environmental labor may be either positive, negative, or zero. 
The primary regressors reflect measures of environmental enforcement in the form of 
government interventions, which include monitoring inspections and enforcement actions. 
Inspections in the NPDES program divide between federal inspections and state inspections. 
Enforcement actions divide between informal actions and monetary penalties. Similar to 
previous studies (Earnhart, 2009; Earnhart and Segerson, 2012), the analysis includes only 
federal enforcement actions, while excluding state actions, because they are generally small in 
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magnitude. Moreover, the analysis splits government interventions into two categories: (1) 
government interventions against one's own facility, and (2) government interventions against all 
other similar facilities, which I consider as other facilities operating in the same sector and 
relevant geographical space. The former measure captures specific deterrence, while the latter 
measure captures general deterrence (Cohen, 2000). Specific deterrence is expected to weigh 
heavier on facilities as they experience the interventions firsthand. 
This study creates the government intervention regressors as follows. First, inspections 
consist of those conducted by the EPA (federal) and those conducted by state agencies (state). 
Federal inspections are expected to weigh heavier on facilities than state inspections, as they are 
much rarer and are considered more severe.
10
 For the measures of specific deterrence, the 
analysis uses the number of federal or state inspections conducted in the 24 months preceding the 






 For general 
deterrence, the analysis separately uses the number of federal or state inspections conducted in 
the 12 months preceding the current year at other facilities of similar size (based on the 
distinction between NPDES major and minor facilities) operating in the same EPA region, in the 
case of federal inspections, and in the same state, in the case of state inspections, divided by the 
number of similarly sized facilities operating in the same EPA region or state (Earnhart and 










 Section 1.6 discusses this point further. 
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 For federal and state inspections separately, the analysis tests whether inspections conducted in 
the 12 months preceding the current year and inspections conducted in the 13 to 24 months preceding the 




The analysis constructs specific and general deterrence measures for informal 
enforcement actions identically to those for federal inspections. The resulting specific deterrence 
measure is denoted as Ait-1
s
, while the general deterrence measure is denoted as Ait-1
g
. For the 
monetary penalty measures, the analysis uses the total amount of penalties levied against the 







 For enforcement actions, one expects monetary penalties to 
generate a larger impact on environmental management than informal actions, such as warning 
letters, because monetary penalties are a very rare, extreme form of punishment. (Since the 
analysis only measures informal enforcement as a count yet penalties in monetary terms, this 
study cannot directly test whether the penalty coefficient exceeds the informal enforcement 
coefficient; instead, by comparing the two coefficient magnitudes, the study can identify the 
amount of money extracted through a penalty needed to generate an effect equal to a single 
informal enforcement action.) 
Table 1.1 summarizes the primary regressors, which reflect federal and state inspections, 
informal enforcement actions, and monetary penalties. Summary statistics show that state 
inspections are conducted more frequently than federal inspections. The average facility is 
subjected to 1.5 state inspections over a 24-month period, yet only 0.07 federal inspections.
13
 As 
for enforcement actions, informal actions are the most common type. The average facility is 




 The analysis tests whether enforcement actions taken in the 12 months preceding the current 
year and enforcement actions taken in the 13 to 24 months preceding the current year generate identical 
coefficient magnitudes. As with inspections, F-test statistics fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal 
coefficients. 
13
 Although federal inspections are conducted much less frequently than state inspections in the 
sample, the analysis is still able to generate statistically significant results for federal inspections. 
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subjected to 0.20 informal enforcement actions over a 24- month period, while only $127 worth 
of monetary fines. (The latter figure reflects a distribution of fines that includes a few large 
penalties and many 24-month periods without a single fine.)
14
 
1.5.2 Control Factors 
The empirical analysis controls for variation in other explanatory variables. 
Environmental management, especially the use of environmental employees, may depend on a 
number of facility-level and firm-level characteristics. First, environmental management may 
depend on the size of the regulated facility. The analysis measures facility size using two 
proxies: the number of facility employees and the NPDES facility classification. The analysis 
includes a “major facility” indicator, with “minor facility” as the omitted category.
15
 Both of 
these control factors should positively affect environmental management since larger facilities 
surely expend more resources to control their waste streams to the same extent as smaller 
facilities. 
Second, the industrial sub-sector in which a facility operates may impact a facility’s 
chosen extent of environmental management. Industrial sub-sector indicators control for 
variation in facilities’ abilities to control their operations based on the type of product being 
manufactured. The analysis includes two sub-sectoral indicators: organic chemical indicator and 
inorganic chemical indicator, with “other chemicals” as the omitted category. 




 Although monetary penalties seldom occur in the sample, I am able to show statistically 
significant effects of penalties on environmental labor. 
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 For the classification of each regulated facility, the EPA calculates a major rating with points 
assigned on the basis of toxic pollution potential, flow type, conventional pollutant load, public health 




Third, the analysis includes a control factor for firm ownership structure, as represented 
by the distinction between publicly held firms and other forms of ownership. This control factor 
captures many dimensions. Facilities owned by publicly held firms may possess greater access to 
external financing for environmentally related investment. And facilities owned by publicly held 
firms are held accountable to stock holders. Thus, publicly held firms may implement more 
environmental management (e.g., hire more environmental workers) at facilities in order to meet 
the demands of the stockholders. The analysis includes a publicly held firm indicator, with other 
firms as the omitted category. 
Environmental management in the form of environmental labor may also depend on local 
community pressure, which is influenced by a facility’s economic impact on the surrounding 
community. On one hand, as the size and visibility of a facility rises, the local community may 
apply more pressure on the facility to improve its environmental management. On the other 
hand, as the facility’s economic impact grows, the local community may tread more lightly, 
fearing that the facility may shift part of its production to other sites or leave town altogether. 
Drawn from survey data, an indicator measures a "significant" or "great" economic impact, with 
a "small" or "very little" economic impact as the omitted category. 
The analysis also includes control factors for attitudes of the workers associated with the 
regulated facility. Facilities with employees who express greater overall concern for the 
environment, as drawn from survey data, should expend greater environmental management 
effort, and thus, hire more environmental employees. The analysis includes controls for attitudes 
held by facility employees and by facility management. First, the analysis includes a facility's 
self-reported measure of concern about the environment as reflected in environmental workers’ 
views. The measure ranges between 1 and 10, with 10 signifying the greatest possible concern. 
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As a complement, the analysis includes a measure of the environmental concern held by facility 
employees in general (i.e., beyond environmental employees). 
Attitudes of facility management relate to the effectiveness of government interventions 
for inducing compliance with NPDES discharge limits. One attitudinal measure captures 
management’s subjective perception of inspections’ effectiveness. The second attitudinal 
measure captures management’s subjective perception of monetary fines’ effectiveness. Both 
measures are binary, revealing an "effective" perception, with a "not effective" perception as the 
omitted category. If a manager feels that inspections or fines are effective at inducing 
compliance, he/she may be more inclined to practice better environmental management in order 
to stay in compliance. If, however, the manager feels that inspections or fines are ineffective, 
he/she may conclude that hiring employees devoted to environmental management is a waste of 
valuable resources. 
These facility-level and firm-level measures are collectively denoted as Fit in the 
empirical model specification. 
Finally, the analysis controls for variation in regulatory pressure not already reflected in 
government intervention measures by including year and regional indicators, denoted as Dt and 
Li, respectively, as regressors. 
Table 1.1 includes summary statistics for the control factors. Most interestingly, the 
average facility employs roughly 260 workers overall. The majority of facilities in the sample are 
designated within the NPDES program as “minor” facilities, are owned by publicly held firms, 
and are located in the eastern half of the United States. Finally, Table 1.1 displays the 




1.5.3 Primary Regression Equation 
 The analysis estimates a semi-log specification by logging the count of environmental 
employees for the dependent variable. Given this functional form, the coefficients of the various 
government intervention factors reflect semi-elasticities: percent changes in the count of 
environmental employees prompted by one unit increases in government interventions. The 
following equation captures the functional relationship between the number of environmental 
employees and the identified explanatory variables: 
f (Yit) = α + β1Iit-1EPAs + β2Iit-1STs + β3Iit-1EPAg + β4Iit-1STg + β5Ait-1s + β6Ait-1g + β7Pit-1s + β8Pit-1g   
+ ηFit + μDt + θLi + εit ,                                 (1.1) 
where β1 through β8 are the coefficients of interest, α represents the intercept term, and εit 
represents an exogenous error term. The empirical analysis estimates this regression equation to 
obtain coefficient estimates and standard errors for the regressors of interest. 
1.6 Econometric Analysis 
This section details the econometric analysis of government interventions and 
environmental labor, by first discussing the potential endogeneity of the primary regressors, then 
discussing estimation techniques, and finally interpreting the estimation results, including an 
assessment of economic impacts implied by the coefficient estimates. 
1.6.1 Potential Endogeneity of the Primary Regressors 
First, the government intervention measures used in the analysis may be endogenous. 
However, this study claims that the constructed measures are indeed exogenously determined 
with respect to environmental labor decisions. The general deterrence measures are clearly 
exogenous, as they reflect government interventions prompted by the behavior and performance 
of other facilities. The specific deterrence measures are exogenous as well given the separation 
21 
 
in time between lagged government interventions and current environmental management 
decisions, consistent with nearly all previous studies using lagged intervention measures 
(Earnhart, 2009; Helland, 1998a; Helland, 1998b; Earnhart and Leonard, 2013; Earnhart and 
Harrington, 2014). A review of the literature, provided by Gray and Shimshack (2011), confirms 
this point. As one of the very few studies to assess the endogeneity of lagged intervention 
measures, Earnhart and Friesen (2014) demonstrate that specific deterrence measures appear 
exogenous. 
By treating the primary regressors as exogenous, the empirical analysis proceeds by 
employing the standard estimation procedures. 
1.6.2 Estimation Techniques 
The empirical analysis utilizes a fixed effects estimator, which includes facility-specific 
indicators as regressors, to address and exploit the panel structure of the sampled data. Thus, 
identification stems exclusively from intra-facility variation. Further, the analysis clusters 
standard errors at the facility level.
16
 The analysis does not use a random effects estimator, which 
also addresses panel data, because the Hausman Test of Random Effects statistic rejects the null 
hypothesis of consistent estimates. The use of a fixed effects estimator is consistent with nearly 
all previous studies of environmental enforcement and environmental management. 
The empirical analysis includes four models (i.e., regressor sets) to assess the robustness 
of the results. Model 1 is the parsimonious model, which includes only the primary regressors. 
Model 2 adds the regional and year indicators. Model 3 represents the full model, which 




 As an alternative specification, standard errors are clustered at the state level. The resulting 




incorporates all facility-level and firm-level controls, in addition to the primary regressors and 
region and year indicators. Table 1.2 reports the fixed effects estimates for Models 1, 2, and 3. 
Model 4 further assesses the robustness of the results. Much of the sampled data is 
collected using a one-time survey, so many of the control factors are time-invariant over the 
sample period. By construction, the fixed effects estimator subsumes the time-invariant factors 
into the facility-specific fixed effects. To retain the effects of these time-invariant factors, the 
analysis interacts each time-invariant factor with a trio of year indicators (1999, 2000, 2001). 
Each year-specific interaction term reflects the year-specific effect of a given time-invariant 
factor. Since this model generates estimation results highly similar to those results generated by 
Models 1, 2, and 3, the study neither tabulates nor interprets the Model 4 results. 
1.6.3 Results 
This sub-section interprets the fixed effects estimates shown in Table 1.2. The empirical 
results reveal that, of the eight primary regressors, consisting of four types of government 
interventions (federal inspections, state inspections, informal enforcement actions, and monetary 
penalties) in two forms of deterrence (general and specific), three regressors significantly affect 
the amount of environmental labor employed by NPDES-regulated facilities. 
First, federal inspections in the form of general deterrence negatively impact 
environmental labor at NPDES-regulated facilities.
17
 Yet state inspection-related general 
deterrence does not influence environmental labor. This pair of results is robust across all three 




 Some states during the sample period had yet to receive authority to implement the NPDES 
program.  For these states, federal inspections were the only type of inspection conducted during the 
sample period. Dropping these states from the analysis does not meaningfully change the estimated 
effects of federal inspections. 
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models. As mentioned above, federal and state inspections differ meaningfully in their purpose 
and severity. State inspections are generally seen as less severe than federal inspections. State 
agencies conduct inspections more frequently, and often inspect to provide compliance 
assistance rather than to gather evidence for enforcement cases (Earnhart, 2004b). Interestingly, 
neither state nor federal inspections in specific deterrence form significantly affect 
environmental labor. 
Second, specific deterrence stemming from both types of enforcement actions - informal 
actions and monetary penalties - negatively impacts environmental labor. These relationships are 
robust to the choice of model since the coefficient magnitudes and significance levels vary only 
slightly across the models. 
This sub-section next discusses the empirical results in further detail. As noted above, 
environmental enforcement measures are expected to influence environmental management, 
specifically environmental labor, in one of two ways. First, facilities utilize environmental 
management to comply with their NPDES permitted discharge limits. If facility managers see 
environmental labor as an important part of their environmental management systems, then 
government interventions should increase the number of individuals employed in this specialized 
form of labor. However, if environmental employees are seen simply as another form of 
expendable labor, rather than as an important part of an EMS, then government interventions 
may in fact cause facility managers to fire environmental employees in order to cut costs. The 
empirical results show that certain types of government interventions result in the loss of 
environmental employees. Specific deterrence stemming from both types of enforcement actions, 
as well general deterrence from federal inspections, negatively impact environmental 
employment. State inspections (in both forms of deterrence), specific deterrence from federal 
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inspections, and general deterrence from both types of enforcement actions generate no 
significant impact on environmental labor. Therefore, the empirical results show that 
environmental regulation has either a negative or zero effect on employment labor, much like 
previous studies of the overall labor impacts from the imposition of environmental regulation 
(e.g., Walker, 2011; Greenstone, 2002; Ferris, et al., 2014). 
These empirical results highlight a number of interesting points in regard to 
environmental regulation and enforcement and their effects on environmental management 
including the use of environmental labor. This study shows that the enforcement of 
environmental regulation has the same impact on environmental labor as the imposition of 
environmental regulation has on overall labor: both negatively impact labor. 
A number of reasons explain these similar impacts. First, facility managers may view 
environmentally related employment as simply another form of employment at the facility. 
Rather than view environmental labor as instrumental in the facility’s environmental 
management efforts to comply with regulatory permits, facility managers may view 
environmental labor as no different from all employees that are subject to termination in order to 
save costs. As shown previously in the literature, this study reveals that environmental regulation 
does indeed negatively impact employment, even environmentally related employment. 
Second, factors other than costs imposed via government interventions may push facility 
managers toward compliance with their NPDES limits. For example, “intrinsic motivations,” 
such as meeting societal or professional norms, may prompt managers to comply. Meeting these 
norms generates “warm glow” for the managers. If the regulator takes overly severe actions to 
keep facilities in compliance (e.g., federal inspections, monetary fines), these actions may crowd 
out intrinsic motivation to comply. At worst, this crowding effect leads to counter-productive 
25 
 
government interventions in that facility managers expend less effort on environmental 
management in response to these interventions. A facility manager may also seek to comply with 
permits, by hiring more environmental labor, to be seen as altruistic, thus, signaling his/her 
environmental “goodness” (Benabou and Tirole, 2006). However, if the regulator takes overly 
severe forms of enforcement, these interventions may “jam” the facility manager’s signal. The 
facility manager becomes reluctant to continue his/her prosocial behavior because society (e.g., 
customers, investors) is less able to discern voluntary compliance from “coerced” compliance. 
Third, facility managers may feel a sense of relief when other facilities experience 
government interventions. Enforcement agencies generally face fixed budgets. Perhaps a specific 
facility manager feels that the likelihood of a government intervention drops when other facilities 
experience more government interventions. For example, this study shows that general 
deterrence from federal inspections negatively affects environmental employment. A specific 
facility manager may witness federal inspections conducted at other facilities and then conclude 
that his/her facility will not be inspected because the EPA regional office has no discretionary 
funds left. This conclusion causes the specific facility manager to allocate fewer resources to 
environmental management. 
Fourth, government interventions may negatively affect environmental labor due to a re-
allocation of environmental management effort. If a facility employs a substantial amount of 
environmental labor, yet still comes under scrutiny from the regulator (in the form of 
government interventions), the facility manager may conclude that the environmental workers 
are not effectively keeping the facility in compliance, prompting the manager to fire workers in 
order to allocate more resources on other environmental management efforts. The most likely 
recipient of the reallocation of environmental management funds is pollution abatement 
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technology. Although most abatement technology must be operated by environmental employees 
with specific training, managers may feel that the combination of more technology and a smaller 
(yet positive) amount of workers provides the best path towards compliance. 
1.6.4 Robustness Checks 
This sub-section assesses the robustness of the conclusions supported by the study’s 
empirical results. As noted above, estimates from the four models support identical conclusions. 
The analysis further assesses the robustness of the empirical results by re-estimating the 
regression for sub-samples based on facility size and location. 
As mentioned in Section 1.3, enforcement of the NPDES program is administered by 
EPA regional offices and individual state agencies. Thus, facilities’ responses to government 
interventions may vary across regions and states. To assess robustness based on facilities’ 
locations, the analysis uses Model 3 to re-estimate the regression equation using two sub-
samples: facilities operating in the eastern U.S. and facilities operating in the western U.S., 
where east and west are based on U.S. Census designated regions. Table A.1 of the appendix 
displays the resulting estimates. As shown, conclusions are robust to the location of the facility, 
with the single exception of general deterrence from federal inspections; the entire sample is 
needed to generate a significantly negative result. 
Enforcement of the NPDES program also depends largely on the NPDES designation of 
“major” facilities versus “minor” facilities. Table A.2 of the appendix displays the results from a 
re-estimation of Model 3 with major and minor facilities separated into two sub-samples. As 
shown, most of the conclusions are robust to the separation between major and minor facilities. 
In particular, the negative effect of specific deterrence from monetary penalties is robust to the 
size of the facility. Interestingly, minor facilities in the survey sample never faced informal 
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enforcement actions over the sample period. Thus, the significant result for this type of 
intervention and form of deterrence comes exclusively from major facilities. Finally, similar to 
geographic location, the significant result for general deterrence from federal inspections 
requires use of the entire sample. 
1.6.5 Economic Impacts 
This last sub-section assesses the economic importance of the results drawing on the 
statistically significant estimates from Model 3 using the full sample. 
The average facility employs 75 employee person-months devoted to environmental 
management. As the empirical results show, all statistically significant government interventions 
negatively affect environmental labor. First, by conducting one more inspection at every facility 
of similar size in a given EPA region (i.e., general deterrence), the federal regulator decreases the 
number of environmental employee person-months at an individual facility by 67 % or roughly 
50 person-months based on the average facility (equivalent to 4.2 FTE employees). While this 
impact is highly substantial, note that one extra federal inspection equals three standard 
deviations in the sample. For enforcement, both informal actions and monetary penalties 
generate a significant impact on environmental employment based on specific deterrence. Issuing 
one more informal enforcement action decreases environmental employment by almost 2 % or 
1.5 person-months based on the average facility (equivalent to only 0.125 FTE employees). 
Similarly, levying a $ 10,000 fine against a facility, rather than no fine, decreases the number of 
environmental employee person-months by 3 %, which represents over two person-months 
(equivalent to 0.188 FTE employees) for the average facility. This small impact seems even less 





This study seeks to determine the effect of government interventions on the use of 
environmental management, specifically environmentally related labor. The analysis examines 
chemical manufacturing facilities permitted under the NPDES program over the years 1999 to 
2001. The analysis finds that all environmental enforcement measures have a zero or negative 
impact on the amount of environmentally related labor employed at facilities in the sample. 
Specifically, empirical results show that general deterrence from federal inspections, specific 
deterrence from informal enforcement actions, and specific deterrence from monetary penalties 
all lower the amount of environmental labor employed by NPDES-regulated facilities. These 
results raise a number of interesting questions about the use of environmental labor as a form of 
environmental management. Further, the empirical results identify the types of government 
interventions that do not appear to decrease environmental employment. 
This study contributes much to the debate over environmental enforcement policy and its 
impact on environmental labor. The need for future research on this important question remains. 
As one especially interesting idea, future research should examine the allocation of labor versus 
that of wastewater treatment capital at regulated facilities, along with facilities’ adjustments to 
this allocation in response to government interventions. In addition, future studies should explore 
more sectors, more types of environmental media (e.g., air, hazardous waste), and other aspects 
of environmental management. Finally, future studies should go beyond environmental 
management efforts by examining the extent of compliance, as determined by the ratio of actual 







Table 1.1: Sample Summary Statistics 




    
Environmental employees (person-month count) 74.94 179.1 2.390 
    
Primary Regressors 
    
# of federal inspections / # of other facilities by EPA region (1-yr 
lag) 
0.029 0.050 1.754 
# of state inspections / # of other facilities by state (1-yr lag) 0.676 0.967 1.430 
# of federal inspections during preceding 24-month period 0.068 0.330 4.825 
# of state inspections during preceding 24-month period 1.497 2.475 1.653 
# of informal enforcement actions / # of other facilities by EPA 
region (1-yr lag) 
0.077 0.190 2.477 
Monetary penalty amount / # of other facilities by EPA region (1-yr 
lag) 
73.95 366.6 4.957 
# of informal enforcement actions during preceding 24-month period 0.200 1.169 5.845 
Monetary penalty amount during preceding 24-month period 127.9 3,577 27.97 
    
Facility / Firm Characteristics 
    
Major facility classification (vs minor facility) 0.386 0.487 1.262 
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs other chemicals) 0.437 0.496 1.135 
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs other chemicals) 0.310 0.463 1.494 
Facility owned by publicly-held firm (vs privately-held firm) 0.635 0.482 0.760 
Facility employees (count) 260.9 481.6 1.850 
Economic impact of facility: significant/great (vs small/very little) 0.710 0.454 0.639 
Facility’s attitudes toward inspection effectiveness:  
     effective (vs not effective) 
0.529 0.500 0.945 
Facility's attitudes toward monetary fine effectiveness: 
     effective (vs not effective) 
0.395 0.489 1.238 
Facility's environmental concern - all employees: 
     1=lowest, 10=highest 
7.377 1.705 0.231 
Facility's environmental concern - environmental employees: 
     1=lowest, 10=highest 
8.894 1.332 0.150 
 
Year/Region Controls 
    
EPA Region 1 (0,1) [regions 8, 9, 10 omitted] 0.034 0.180 5.357 
EPA Region 2 (0,1) [regions 8, 9, 10 omitted] 0.090 0.286 3.192 
EPA Region 3 (0,1) [regions 8, 9, 10 omitted] 0.131 0.337 2.573 
EPA Region 4 (0,1) [regions 8, 9, 10 omitted] 0.246 0.431 1.752 
 




Table 1.1 (continued) 
    
    
EPA Region 6 (0,1) [regions 8, 9, 10 omitted] 0.220 0.415 1.886 
EPA Region 7 (0,1) [regions 8, 9, 10 omitted] 0.067 0.250 3.720 
Year 2000 (0,1) [Year 1999 omitted] 0.333 0.472 1.417 
Year 2001 (0,1) [Year 1999 omitted] 0.333 0.472 1.417 
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Constant 3.014 2.999 2.693 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Number of Observations 743 743 709 
Facility indicators included Yes Yes Yes 
Regional indicators included    
Year indicators included No Yes Yes 
Facility/firm characteristics included No No Yes 
    
 
Notes: 
p-values are shown in parentheses. 
Bold text identifies coefficients that are significant at the 10 % level or better (p ≤ 0.10). 


































President, governors appoint agency 
directors 
 
Agency directors implement overall 
enforcement strategy 
 
Low-level agency employees conduct 
inspections at and bring informal 
enforcement actions against facilities, with 
much discretion 
 
Lawyers at agencies initiate administrative 
proceedings or refer cases to Dept. of 
Justice, with much discretion 
 
Administrative or civil judges decide on 
imposition of formal sanctions 
 
Figure 1.1: National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Monitoring and Enforcement 
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2 Effect of Cooperative Enforcement Strategies on Wastewater Management: 
Innovation or Regulatory Capture? 
2.1 Introduction 
Government interventions of polluting facilities, such as monitoring inspections, 
warnings, and fines, have been the norm for inducing compliance with environmental laws since 
the early 1970s.  The economic literature is rife with empirical analysis that examines the 
efficacy of such interventions across a wide range of environmental media and economic sectors 
(Gray and Deily, 1996; Laplante and Rilstone, 1996; Helland, 1998a; Helland, 1998b; Earnhart, 
2004a; Earnhart, 2004b). 
These government interventions represent components of a broader environmental 
enforcement policy. Within the environmental policy realm, there exists a fierce debate about the 
better way to induce environmental compliance through enforcement. The debate focuses on the 
comparative merits of two enforcement approaches - the coercive (or deterrence-based) approach 
and the cooperative (or flexibility-based) approach. Under a coercive approach, the 
environmental regulator, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), deters facilities 
from non-compliance with environmental laws by imposing enforcement sanctions for 
violations. Consistent with the basic deterrence model (Becker, 1968), the coercive approach 
operates on the premise that regulated facilities do not wish to comply with environmental 
requirements. Thus, the imposed sanctions are designed to make non-compliance more 
expensive than compliance. In contrast, under a cooperative approach, the environmental 
regulator provides flexibility to regulated facilities as a means of facilitating compliance. 
Contrary to the coercive approach, the cooperative approach operates on the premise that 
regulated entities react to a variety of motives, such as societal and professional norms, that 
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supply adequate incentives to comply with regulatory obligations. This debate has recently 
gained attention from a feature piece in the New York Times that discusses North Dakota's 
cooperative approach to the regulation of oil wells in the Bakken shale (Sontag and Gebeloff, 
2014). 
Since the initial implementation of federal environmental protection laws in the United 
States, enforcement has shifted away from exclusive reliance on coercive enforcement and 
towards a more partnership-based, less adversarial, cooperative approach (Stoughton et al., 
2001). Further, many states have replaced traditional coercive enforcement with a form of 
cooperation (Andreen, 2007). This shift has stemmed partially from the perspective that a 
cooperative approach is more “innovative” than traditional, coercive enforcement. Despite the 
debate prompted by this progression, very little empirical research directly compares the two 
approaches regarding the ability of each approach to induce environmental compliance. 
One can interpret the contrast between coercion and cooperation using the lens of 
regulatory capture. Captured regulators do not advance the interests of those they serve (e.g., 
society at large) but rather the special interests of the regulated community (Stigler, 1971; 
Laffont and Tirole, 1991).
18
 From this perspective, what appears as cooperation may be nothing 
more than regulatory capture. In fact, on the spectrum of coercion to cooperation, regulatory 
capture lies at the upper end of extreme cooperation (Zinn, 2002). Most relevant to the current 
study, the risks of regulatory capture are most acute in the realm of enforcement (Zinn, 2002), 
where agency discretion is substantial.  Despite this strong potential for regulatory capture, no 




 The recent case of North Dakota's regulation of the oil and gas industry, as featured in a New 
York Times feature article, presents an excellent example of apparent regulatory capture. 
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previous study of regulatory capture uses a measure of cooperative enforcement to reflect 
potential regulatory capture. 
This study contributes to the literatures on government intervention effectiveness and 
regulatory capture, as well as the debate over enforcement strategy, by exploring the extent of 
cooperation extended by regulators to regulated facilities versus the extent of coercion exerted 
against facilities as part of the regulator’s overall enforcement strategy. In particular, this study 
explores the influence of the overall enforcement strategy on the effects of government 
interventions on the extent of environmental management expended by regulated facilities.
19
 As 
an additional contribution to the regulatory capture literature, this study explores environmental 
regulation, which few previous studies consider (e.g., Earnhart, 1997; Deily and Gray, 1991). 
As a second contribution to the literature on government intervention effectiveness, this 
study examines a previously ignored, yet highly important, form of environmental management: 
the amount of labor dedicated to environmental management (i.e., number of employees devoted 
specifically to environmental management at a given facility). Clearly, labor is an important part 
of a facility's operations. Similarly, environmentally related labor represents a critical input into 
any facility’s efforts to manage its waste stream. Most regulated facilities operate some sort of 
discharge treatment equipment demanding at least one environmental employee with proper 
training. Most important, environmental labor effectively improves compliance with pollution 
control laws (Earnhart and Glicksman, 2011). The presence of environmental employees is 
substantial. Within the sampled facilities, the average ratio of environmental employees to 




 Environmental management is defined as any method used by facilities to control pollution, 
e.g., self-audits, internal monitoring protocols, end-of-pipe treatment technologies. 
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overall employees at an individual facility equals 0.046; meaning 4.6 % of the average facility’s 
workforce specializes in environmental management.
20
 Thus, facilities invest a significant 
amount of time and resources into ensuring the necessary human expertise is present in their 
operations. Finally, in today's political environment, where environmental regulations and efforts 
to reduce pollution are considered detrimental to employment, the study’s assessment of 
environmental employees is important. The study’s empirical results can help to reveal how best 
to conduct government interventions and craft an overall enforcement strategy in ways that boost 
environmental-related employment. 
Despite this importance, no previous economic study of environmental management 
explores the allocation of environmental labor. Instead, previous studies examine other types of 
environmental management: implementation of an environmental management system [EMS] 
(Johnstone and Labonne, 2009), certification of an EMS (Christman and Taylor, 2001; Arimura 
et al., 2008; Dasgupta et al., 2000; Henriques and Sadorsky, 2007; and Delmas and Toffel, 
2008), audits (Earnhart and Leonard, 2013; Evans et al., 2011), and various other management 
forms (Garcia et al., 2009). As the closest studies, Greenstone (2002), Berman and Bui (2001), 
Gray et al. (2014), and Ferris et al. (2014) examine the impact of government regulation on total 
employment at a facility or within an industry, but do not specifically assess environmental 
employment. In the present study, I focus on the impacts of monitoring and enforcement on 
environmentally related employment. Previous studies, however, examine the effect of 




 This value is higher than the value of 1 % provided by the Census Pollution Abatement 
Controls and Expenditures (PACE) survey for the chemical manufacturing sector. The substantially larger 
percentage for the present sample is expected; the sample includes only facilities regulated under the 
CWA, while the PACE survey covers all chemical manufacturing facilities. 
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regulation on total employment. (Using the survey data, I am able to assess this same effect on 
total employment, but the identified studies cannot assess the effect on environmental 
employment since the publicly available microdata do not distinguish between environmental 
and other employment.) 
The absence of analysis on environmental employees follows from the lack of available 
data. As the nearest efforts, the Department of Commerce and the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) have attempted to quantify this type of labor in the "Measuring the Green Economy 
Report" (Department of Commerce, 2010) and the “Employment in Green Goods and Services” 
report (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011), respectively. Both reports estimate the number of 
environmental jobs. The BLS estimates 24,733 environmental employees were working in the 
chemical manufacturing sector as of 2011. While these estimates are useful for aggregate 
analysis, I claim that my data are superior since these data were collected through a survey of 
chemical manufacturing facilities that captured the count of employees responsible for managing 
wastewater discharges, which were regulated by Clean Water Act permits. Thus, my data on 
environmental employees relate directly to regulatory compliance and, by extension, government 
inspections and enforcement actions designed to induce compliance, i.e., deter non-compliance. 
As its final contribution, this study focuses on the labor impacts of the enforcement of 
regulations. All previous studies of labor impacts ignore the enforcement aspect of regulation, 
instead focusing on the imposition of regulations (Greenstone, 2002; Berman and Bui, 2001; 
Gray et al., 2014; Ferris et al., 2014). 
In order to generate these contributions, this study constructs an index that ranges from a 
completely coercive approach to a completely cooperative approach. Then the analysis interacts 
this index with various measures of government interventions: federal inspections, state 
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inspections, informal enforcement actions (e.g., notices of violation), and monetary penalties. By 
interpreting the coefficients associated with these interaction terms, the analysis is able to 
determine whether greater cooperation (i.e., less coercion) improves or undermines the 
effectiveness of the various government interactions for prompting greater environmental 
protection effort from regulated facilities in the form of environmental labor. If a cooperative 
enforcement approach improves the effectiveness of government interventions, then cooperation 
could be regarded as an innovative, proactive environmental enforcement policy. If a cooperative 
enforcement approach instead undermines the effectiveness of government interventions, then 
cooperation could be interpreted as regulatory capture under a different name. This interpretation 
is even more appropriate if greater cooperation leads to counter-productive effects, i.e., 
government interventions negatively impact environmental labor under a cooperative 
enforcement approach. For this empirical analysis, the present study gathers data on 
environmental labor using a phone survey administered to U.S. chemical manufacturing facilities 
regulated under the Clean Water Act. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature on 
environmental enforcement, environmental management, regulatory capture, and the labor 
impacts of environmental regulations. Section 2.3 describes the relevant regulatory context. 
Section 2.4 constructs a conceptual framework, which produces testable hypotheses. Section 2.5 
describes the econometric framework. Section 2.6 discusses the studied data. Section 2.7 details 
the econometric analysis and its results. Finally, Section 2.8 concludes, while discussing the 
policy implications of the empirical results. 
2.2 Literature Review 
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 This section reviews the literature relating to environmental enforcement, management, 
labor, and regulatory capture. 
2.2.1 Public Enforcement of Environmental Laws 
Both theoretical and empirical analysis explores the public enforcement of environmental 
laws. Most of the theoretical analysis focuses on the coercive approach to enforcement. The 
theoretical foundation for the coercive approach is found in the model of Becker (1968). Since 
then, a number of studies have expanded this model; Polinsky and Shovell (2000) provide a 
thorough review of this literature. In this model, the enforcement agency monitors the 
compliance of regulated facilities and deters non-compliance by imposing sanctions in response 
to violations. 
The theoretical literature lacks a conceptual framework capturing the form of cooperation 
explored in the present study. The related studies focus on specific aspects of cooperation, rather 
than an overarching relationship between the regulator and the regulated facility. As one primary 
example, Harrington (1988) shows that regulators and regulated entities can cooperate with one 
another. Other studies examine different, specific aspects of cooperation. For example, regulators 
cooperate by enforcing some laws more stringently in an attempt to induce better compliance 
with others (Heyes and Rickman, 1999; Arguedas, 2005; Amacher and Malik, 1998; Heyes, 
2005). As the most relevant theoretical framework, Scholz (1991) shows that a cooperative 
strategy of enforcement can improve the effectiveness of enforcement. 
Nearly all of the previous empirical studies explore the coercive model by examining the 
effect of environmental enforcement on facility- or firm-level environmental performance or 
management (Gray and Shadbegian, 2004; Shimshack and Ward, 2005; Gray and Deily, 1996; 
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Laplante and Rhilstone, 1996; and Earnhart, 2004a; Earnhart, 2004b; Earnhart and Leonard, 
2013). Gray and Shimshack (2011) provide a thorough review of this literature. 
Empirical studies of the cooperative approach are few. One such study examines state 
programs to reduce erosion and sediment in urban areas in North Carolina (Burby and Paterson, 
1993). Burby (1995) examines this same sector; he finds that the better programs tend to the 
highly coercive ones. Harrison (1995) examines pulp and paper mills operating in Canada, where 
regulators employ a more cooperative approach, and in the US, where regulators employ a more 
coercive approach. She tests whether compliance rates are higher in Canada or the US and finds 
that Canadian compliance rates are much lower than U.S. rates. Lastly, Andreen (2007) finds that 
compliance rates for major dischargers regulated under the Clean Water Act did not significantly 
change during a period when many states were moving from a coercive approach to a more 
cooperative one. 
2.2.2 Regulatory Capture 
 The literature on the theory of regulatory capture is large and influential in economics. 
Stigler’s seminal paper (1971) provides a theoretical basis for regulatory capture, and also 
empirically tests the theory using data on the railroad industry. Peltzman (1976), Tirole (1986), 
and Laffont and Tirole (1991) expand the theory. Other theoretical studies of regulatory capture 
model the main reasons why capture is possible: asymmetric information between firms and the 
regulator (Lohmann, 1993; Snyder, 1991) and positive incentives for the regulator, such as a 
revolving door of employment between regulators and industry (Che, 1995; Salant, 1995). More 
closely related to the current study, Maloney and McCormick (1982) examine regulatory capture 
in the realm of environmental regulation. The authors first theoretically model regulation of an 
industry that produces negative externalities (e.g., environmental regulation), while 
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demonstrating that regulation creates incentive for capture. Zinn (2002) argues that regulatory 
capture lies at the upper end of the spectrum from coercion to cooperation between the regulator 
and a regulated entity. 
 While many studies theoretically explore regulatory capture, far fewer studies empirically 
examine different forms of regulatory capture.
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 These empirical studies cover a wide range of 
regulatory realms: telecommunications (Besley and Coate, 2003; Dnes, 1995; De Figueiredo and 
Edwards, 2007), trade (Hansen and Park, 1995; Eicher and Osang, 2002), and energy (Dal Bo 
and Rossi, 2007). Dal Bo (2006) provides a thorough review of both the theoretical and 
empirical literatures. 
2.2.3 Environmental Management 
This study’s assessment of the effect of enforcement on environmental labor sits within a 
larger literature exploring regulated facilities’ environmental management decisions. A number 
of studies examine a facility's decision to establish and operate an environmental management 
system (EMS). In some cases, facilities decide to obtain certification of their EMSs based on 
commercial standards, such as ISO 14001 certification. Christmann and Taylor (2001), Arimura 
et al. (2008), Nakamura et al. (2001), Dasgupta et al. (2000), Henriques and Sadorsky (2007), 
Delmas and Toffel (2008), and Mori and Welch (2008) examine facilities' adoption of ISO 
14001-certified EMSs. More relevant to the present study, several previous studies analyze 
specific types of environmental management. Khanna and Anton (2002), Anton et al. (2004), and 
Harrington et al. (2008) examine companies’ decisions to undertake various environmental 








management and/or pollution prevention practices by summing across the practices, i.e., 
dependent variable is a count of practices. Khanna et al. (2007), Jones (2010), Ervin et al. (2012), 
Garcia et al. (2009), and Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) separately analyze companies' decisions 
to administer specific environmental management and pollution prevention practices. Some 
studies focus on one specific environmental management practice: environmental self-audits 
(Earnhart and Leonard, 2013; Evans et al., 2011; Earnhart and Harrington, 2014). 
2.2.4 Labor Impacts of Environmental Regulation 
 Within the economic literature, many studies examine the labor impacts of various 
environmental regulations. As examples, Greenstone (2002) finds that the Clean Air Act’s 
designation of attainment vs. non-attainment counties has significant labor impacts in multiple 
manufacturing sectors. Berman and Bui (2001) examine the stringency of air quality regulation 
in the Los Angeles area. Gray et al. (2014) study the impacts of the Cluster Rule on the number 
of jobs in the pulp and paper industry, and find minimal effects. Finally, Ferris et al. (2014) find 
that Phase I of the Title IV SO2 trading program had negligible effects on employment at fossil 
fuel-fired plants. 
2.2.5 Contributions of Present Study 
This study contributes to these literatures in three ways. First, this study explores the 
extent of cooperation extended by regulators to regulated facilities versus the extent of coercion 
exerted against facilities as part of the regulator’s overall enforcement strategy. In particular, this 
study assesses the influence of the overall enforcement strategy on the effects of government 
interventions on the extent of environmental management expended by regulated facilities. In the 
process, the study assesses whether a cooperative enforcement strategy improves the 
effectiveness of government interventions, and thus appears “innovative”, or undermines the 
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effectiveness of government interventions, and thus simply reflects regulatory capture. In the 
worst case, cooperation may actually lead to counter-productive effects of government 
interventions on environmental management. Second, this study examines a previously ignored, 
yet highly important, form of environmental management: the amount of labor dedicated to 
environmental management. Finally, this study is the first to examine the effects of employment 
from the enforcement of environmental regulations rather than the imposition of regulations. 
2.3 Regulatory Context 
 This section describes the regulatory context relevant to the analysis. 
2.3.1 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
This study examines environmental behavior relating to the U.S. Clean Water Act 
(CWA). One of the CWA's main purposes is protecting water quality by controlling wastewater 
discharges from point sources. To this end, the EPA created a permitting program to control 
these point sources known as the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).  
The system’s main form of control is the issuance of facility-specific permits, which identify the 
pollutant-specific discharge limits imposed on regulated facilities.
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 Permits are issued and re-
issued generally on a 5-year cycle by the EPA or authorized state agencies. When establishing 
discharge limits within individual facilities’ permits, the issuing agency considers the relevant 
Effluent Limitation Guideline standard, which is designed to require a minimum level of 
wastewater treatment for a given industry, and the state water quality-based standard, which is 
designed to ensure that the water body receiving the discharges meets state-based ambient 








surface water quality standards. After a candidate discharge limit is determined under each 
standard, the more stringent limit is written into the permit. Each discharge limit represents a 
performance-based standard under which compliance is based solely on one's own discharges. 
Thus, a facility may use any available abatement method to comply with its permitted limits. A 
myriad of abatement methods are available to facilities: end-of-pipe treatment technologies (i.e., 
capital), deployment of labor, and other methods. Clearly the deployment of labor enhances the 
effectiveness of equipment and other methods. For example, wastewater engineers monitor the 
operation of treatment technologies. 
In the NPDES system, permitted facilities are required to monitor and self-report their 
discharges on a regular basis. To ensure compliance with issued permits, the EPA and state 
agencies periodically inspect facilities and take enforcement actions as needed. Agencies possess 
great discretion over monitoring and enforcement decisions. The use of inspections and 
enforcement actions occur both in cooperative and coercive regimes. In this sense, enforcement 
is neither “traditional” nor “innovative”; it is both. While the EPA retains authority to monitor 
and impose sanctions on facilities, the state regulators are primarily responsible for monitoring 
and enforcement. Inspections represent the base of environmental agencies’ efforts to monitor 
compliance and collect evidence for enforcement (Wasserman, 1984); inspections also maintain 
a regulatory presence (EPA, 1990). As for enforcement, agencies use a mixture of informal 
enforcement actions (e.g., warning letters) and formal enforcement actions, which include 
penalties (i.e., fines). The EPA expects monitoring inspections and enforcement actions to 
generate both specific and general deterrence. Specific deterrence prompts the specific facility 
inspected or enforced against to improve its subsequent compliance, while general deterrence 
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prompts other facilities to improve their subsequent compliance (Cohen, 2000); both forms of 
deterrence are explained further in Section 2.5. 
2.3.2 Regulatory Structure 
This sub-section describes the structure of environmental agencies and other entities 
involved in environmental enforcement. Figure 2.1 displays this structure. Both the EPA and 
nearly all state agencies possess the authority to inspect NPDES facilities and take enforcement 
actions against facilities in non-compliance.
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 Agencies enforce the Clean Water Act by issuing 
warning letters or initiating and prosecuting cases before judges who are able to impose fines. 
Lower-level personnel at the EPA and state agencies possess broad discretion over inspection 
decisions: who to inspect and when. Similarly, lower-level agency personnel possess broad 
discretion over decisions to take informal enforcement actions such as issuing "Notices of 
Violation" and warning letters: against which facilities to take enforcement actions and when. 
Both inspections and informal enforcement actions represent day-to-day activities conducted 
without much upper-level guidance. 
As important, lawyers at environmental agencies are responsible for prosecuting 
enforcement cases before administrative judges or forwarding cases to the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) with a request for prosecution before civil judges. For example, lawyers at EPA regional 
offices may initiate an administrative proceeding in order to impose an administrative sanction, 
or may request that the DOJ initiate a civil court proceeding in order to impose a civil sanction 
on facilities that are seriously non-compliant. These lawyers operate with much discretion and 




 In order to obtain approval for NPDES authority, a state agency must demonstrate the 




without guidance from upper-level administrators. Critically, a firewall separates top 
administrators from enforcement cases at the EPA and presumably all state agencies in order to 
avoid even the impression of political influence. 
Once agency or DOJ lawyers initiate enforcement proceedings, administrative or civil 
judges decide on the imposition of the formal sanctions. 
In strong contrast to these inspection and enforcement case decisions, the choice of 
overall enforcement strategy lies at the top levels of environmental agencies. This strategic 
choice represents a high-level decision made by top agency administrators, who are appointed by 
the U.S. President, in the case of EPA headquarters and regional offices, and by governors, in the 
case of state agencies. Therefore, the enforcement strategy is chosen by a distinctively different 
set of agency officials and separately from how inspections and enforcement actions are decided 
on a regular basis.
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2.3.3 Chemical Manufacturing Sector 
The CWA primarily constrains wastewater discharges from point sources, which fall into 
one of two categories: municipal sources (i.e., municipal wastewater treatment facilities) and 
industrial sources.
25
 This study focuses on a single sector within the category of industrial 
sources: chemical manufacturing facilities. This focus on a single sector is consistent with other 
empirical studies of industrial pollution (e.g., Laplante and Rilstone, 1996; Barla, 2007; Earnhart, 
2009; Earnhart and Harrington, 2014). 




 The EPA website depicts the basic elements of the enforcement process: 
http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/enforcement-basic-information. 
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The chemical manufacturing sector proves an excellent choice for analyzing the influence 
of enforcement approach on the effect of government interventions on environmental labor. First, 
the EPA has shown a strong interest in this sector. The EPA jointly authored a study with the 
Chemical Manufacturing Association (CMA) on the root causes of non-compliance in this sector 
(EPA, 1999). The EPA also published its own study on the compliance history for chemical 
manufacturers (EPA, 1997). Two sub-sectors in the industry, industrial organics and chemical 
preparations, were regarded by the EPA as priority sectors during a portion of the study period. 
Further, the CMA has demonstrated a strong interest in promoting pollution reduction and 
prevention with its Responsible Care initiative. The chemical manufacturing sector also 
generates a large amount of wastewater. Data on wastewater discharged in 2008 that are 
disaggregated by 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code reveal that four of the 10 
most polluting sub-sectors operate in the chemical manufacturing sector (EPA, 2011). Finally, 
the chemical manufacturing sector employs a substantial number of environmental workers. As 
mentioned, the average facility in the sample has a ratio of environmental employment to total 
employment of 0.046. According to BLS estimates, the chemical manufacturing sector employs 
24,733 environmental workers, roughly 5 % of the total green employment in the manufacturing 
industry, making the chemical manufacturing sector the most “green” employer of all aggregated 
sectors (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011).  Although the preceding reasons explain why this 
sector is appropriate for analysis, I acknowledge that the results from a study of the chemical 
manufacturing industry may not generalize to other industrial sectors. 
2.4 Conceptual Framework 
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2.4.1 Effects of Government Interventions on Environmental Management 
This section constructs a theoretical framework from which testable hypotheses are 
derived. This framework draws upon Becker (1968), Earnhart and Segerson (2012), Earnhart 
(2013), and Earnhart and Friesen (2014). Each individual firm faces environmental regulations, 
imposed within its NPDES permit, with which it must comply. (The theoretical analysis assumes 
that each firm owns a single facility so no difference exists between the firm and facility.) In 
each year, the manager chooses the firm's level of environmental management, as measured by 
the count of person-months for which employees spend dedicated to environmental tasks. The 
firm manager has a utility function U(Π, Z), where Π reflects the firm’s net profits and Z reflects 
non-monetary factors that influence decisions, which are discussed further in sub-section 2.4.2. 
Utility is increasing in both components. The firm generates gross profits per period of π and 
faces environmental compliance costs of c, such as wastewater engineer salaries, in each period. 
The probability of detection, if the firm violates the law, is p. Once detected, a violation leads to 
a fine of F. 
2.4.1.1 Standard deterrence model 
This section first constructs the standard deterrence model (Becker, 1968). In this sub-
section, non-monetary factors, Z, are suppressed in the utility function by assuming they are 
irrelevant; these factors are re-introduced in the next sub-section. The firm receives a certain net 
profit of π - c if it complies; yielding the following level of managerial expected utility: 
EU(comply) = U(π-c) .           (2.1) 
However, if the firm violates the law, the expected utility is as follows: 
EU(violate) = p × U(π-F) + (1-p) × U(π) .         (2.2) 
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In this situation, the manager chooses to comply when (2.1) > (2.2), and violates otherwise. An 
increase in either the probability of detection, p, or the size of the fine once detected to be in non-
compliance, F, reduces (2.2), thereby making it more likely that any given firm complies. The 
enforcement agency increases the probability of detection by conducting inspections more 
frequently and increases the size of the fine by imposing a bigger fine. 
2.4.1.2 Intrinsic Compliance Motivations 
This sub-section extends the deterrence model by allowing the manager’s utility function 
to depend on non-monetary factors, Z, so that these factors influence the manager’s compliance 
decision. (The survey of chemical manufacturing facilities captures some of these non-monetary 
factors as explained further in Section 2.5.) The theoretical analysis focuses on intrinsic 
compliance motivations, such as the internalization of norms regarding environmental 
compliance existing in local communities (social norms) and professional organizations 
(professional norms). Suppose that Z = Zc > 0 when the firm complies, while Z = Zv = 0 when 
the firm violates. The act of compliance increases Z due to the "warm glow" feelings of meeting 
social or professional norms. More generally, the magnitude of Zc depends on social and 
professional norms regarding environmental compliance, along with other intrinsic motivations. 
A manager facing a larger Zc is therefore more likely to comply, ceteris paribus. 
Clearly, alternative formulations of Zv and Zc are possible. For example, violations may 
generate a "cold prickle" effect so that Zv < 0. Since the manager’s utility is rising in Z, the 
positive relationship between Z and compliance likelihood continues to hold as long as Zc > Zv. 
This critical difference reflects the manager’s desire to comply due to intrinsic motivations. This 




EU(comply) = U(π-c, Z), and           (2.3) 
EU(violate) = p × U(π-F, Z) + (1-p) × U(π, Z) .        (2.4) 
In this extended model, compliance is increasing in both enforcement and intrinsic 
motivations. However, the manager’s intrinsic motivation to comply is not connected to 
enforcement decisions, so enforcement generates no trade-off. The analysis captures this trade-
off by incorporating additional elements. First, the analysis removes the implicit assumption that 
the firm manager possesses full information about the enforcement parameters faced by the firm. 
In reality, firm managers possess only imperfect knowledge about these factors (Polinsky and 
Shavell, 2000). For example, enforcement agencies rarely announce the probability of detection. 
In this context, firm behavior is driven by perceptions of the enforcement parameters rather than 
objective values. Consistent with this reality, the analysis assumes that the firm manager 
possesses imperfect knowledge about the enforcement parameters. In particular, let p° denote the 
manager’s perception of the likelihood of being caught and F° be the assessment of the fine 
severity. The expected utility from violation then becomes the following: 
EU(violate)= p° × U(π-F°, Z) + (1-p°) × U(π, Z) .        (2.5) 
Based on the extended model of Section 2.4.2, increases in p° and/or F° lead to improved 
compliance. 
2.4.2 Coercion versus Cooperation 
Finally, the analysis incorporates the factor of coercive intensity, denoted as I. Coercive 
intensity improves the deterrence effects stemming from enforcement by inflating enforcement 
perceptions: p° and F°. One can interpret coercive intensity and cooperation in the light of 
regulatory capture. Cooperation may in fact be a form of regulatory capture (Zinn, 2002). As 
regulatory capture rises, coercive intensity wanes. Put differently, as trust and compromise rises, 
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rather than oversight and principle, the blade of enforcement’s knife dulls and the legitimacy of 
enforcement withers. 
On the opposite side of the ledger, coercive intensity undermines the non-monetary 
benefits of compliance, Zc. A firm manager enjoys a weaker "warm glow" when he/she is 
deterred from non-compliance rather than choosing to comply for his/her own intrinsic reasons. 
Put differently, the monetary rewards to comply “crowd out” the intrinsic motivation to comply 
(Fehr and Falk, 2002; Frey and Jegen, 2001). Given these relationships involving coercive 
intensity, increases in coercive intensity lead to greater deterrence from non-compliance but less 
intrinsic desire to comply. 
With this trade-off in place, the theoretical framework informally generates three pairs of 
hypotheses based on the aforementioned coercive and cooperative models. The first pair of 
hypotheses, jointly labeled as H1, relates to the main effect of the overall enforcement approach.  
H1: Coercive model - If non-monetary factors are absent, i.e., firm managers possess no 
intrinsic motivation to comply, then an increase in coercive intensity, I, leads to more 
compliance. 
Cooperative model - If enforcement perceptions do not differ from objective measures of 
enforcement likelihood and severity due to variation in coercive intensity, then an increase in 
coercive intensity, I, leads to less compliance.  
The coercive hypothesis holds even if non-monetary factors are present, as long as the 
connection between coercive intensity and intrinsic motivation is sufficiently weak so the 
deterrence effect generated by greater coercive intensity dominates. Similarly, the cooperative 
hypothesis still holds even if coercive intensity positively influences enforcement perceptions, as 
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long as this positive relationship is sufficiently weak so the crowding out effect generated by 
greater coercive intensity dominates. 
The second pair of hypotheses, jointly labeled as H2, relates to the effect of inspections 
on compliance. As shown in sub-section 2.4.1.1, increased inspection frequency prompts greater 
compliance. However, in the presence of intrinsic motivations, the level of coercive intensity 
influences the effect of inspections on compliance. Moreover, this influence differs between 
federal and state inspections. Regulated firms may perceive federal inspections as more coercive 
in nature since they are frequently conducted to gather evidence to support enforcement cases, 
while regulated firms may perceive state inspections as more cooperative since they generally 
provide compliance assistance (Earnhart, 2004b). Thus, federal inspections undermine intrinsic 
motivations more than state inspections.  
H2: Coercive model - An increase in coercive intensity improves the effectiveness of 
federal inspections at inducing greater compliance, yet degrades the effectiveness of state 
inspections.  
Cooperative model - An increase in coercive intensity improves the effectiveness of state 
inspections at inducing greater compliance yet degrades the effectiveness of federal inspections. 
The third pair of hypotheses relate to enforcement. As shown in sub-section 2.4.1.1, 
larger fines prompt greater compliance. However, in the presence of intrinsic motivations, the 
level of coercive intensity influences the effect of enforcement on compliance. Moreover, this 
influence differs across the forms of enforcement: informal enforcement actions and penalties (as 
described in Section 3). Regulated firms may perceive informal enforcement actions as the least 
coercive in nature and penalties as the most coercive. Thus, informal enforcement actions 
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undermine intrinsic motivations less and penalties undermine intrinsic motivations more. Given 
this distinction, the final set of hypotheses follows, jointly labeled as H3. 
H3: Coercive model - An increase in coercive intensity improves the effectiveness of 
enforcement at inducing greater compliance with the improvement smaller for informal 
enforcement actions and larger for penalties. 
Cooperative model - An increase in coercive intensity degrades the effectiveness of 
enforcement with the degradation smaller for informal enforcement actions and larger for 
penalties. 
These hypotheses are derived from a deterministic model. In reality, compliance depends 
on both the firm’s efforts and random factors. The firm cannot guarantee compliance, and as 
such, always faces a probability of a fine. The theoretical results still hold as long as this 
probability of being fined when the firm employs more environmental labor in order to comply is 
sufficiently smaller than the probability of being fined when the firm employs less labor in order 
to comply. While a firm cannot guarantee its compliance status, they are able to increase the 
likelihood of compliance by employing more environmental labor. Thus, any theoretical 
examination of a firm’s efforts to comply parallels the theoretical analysis of compliance status. 
2.5 Econometric Framework 
This section draws upon the theoretical framework to build an econometric framework 
for estimating the influence of enforcement strategy on the effects of government interventions 
on environmental employment. 
2.5.1 Dependent Variable and Primary Regressors 
In each year t, facility i chooses its level of environmental management, denoted as Yit, 
which represents the count of person-months devoted to environmental management by facility 
55 
 
employees. The primary regressors are the overall enforcement strategy and government 
interventions.
26
 The analysis constructs a multi-dimensional measure of enforcement strategy, 
which is described fully in Section 2.6 and depicted in Table 2.1. 
Other primary regressors capture government interventions. First, government 
interventions divide between inspections and enforcement actions; moreover, inspections divide 
between federal inspections and state inspections, and enforcement actions divide between 
informal actions and monetary penalties. Similar to some previous studies (Earnhart, 2009; 
Earnhart and Segerson, 2012), the analysis includes only federal enforcement actions, while 
excluding state actions, because the latter are small in magnitude and data are challenging to 
secure. Second, the analysis splits government interventions into two categories: (1) government 
interventions against one's own facility, and (2) government interventions against other facilities 
that are similar to one's own. The former generate specific deterrence, while the latter generate 
general deterrence (Cohen, 2000); which is the threat of receiving an intervention. 
The analysis constructs the government intervention regressors as follows. Consider first 
federal and state inspections. For the measures of specific deterrence, the analysis uses the 
number of federal or state inspections conducted in the 24 months preceding the current year at 






 For the measures of general 
deterrence, the analysis uses the number of federal or state inspections conducted in the 12 
months preceding the current year at other facilities of similar size (based on the distinction 




 These primary regressors may be endogenous. Section 2.6 discusses this potential concern. 
27
 For federal and state inspections separately, the analysis tests whether inspections conducted in 
the 12 months preceding the current year and inspections conducted in the 13 to 24 months preceding the 




between NPDES major and minor facilities) operating in the same EPA region, in the case of 
federal inspections, and in the same state, in the case of state inspections, divided by the number 
of similarly sized facilities operating in the same EPA region or state (Earnhart and Leonard, 





The analysis constructs specific and general deterrence measures for informal 
enforcement actions in a manner similar to inspections. The resulting specific deterrence 
measure is denoted as Ait-1
s
, while the general deterrence measure is denoted as Ait-1
g
. For the 
penalty measures, the analysis uses the total amount of penalties levied against the individual 
facility or other facilities rather than the count of penalties. The specific and general deterrence 







In order to determine the influence of overall enforcement strategy on the effects of these 
four types of government interventions, measured in two deterrence forms, the analysis interacts 
the enforcement strategy index, Ri, with each government intervention measure. This framing 
implies eight factors of regulatory deterrence, plus their interactions with the enforcement 
strategy index. While sizable, this number of primary regressors is consistent with enforcement 
of the NPDES program, as described in Section 2.3. 
2.5.2 Control Factors 
The empirical analysis controls for variation in other explanatory variables. 
Environmental management may depend on facility and firm characteristics. First, industrial sub-




 Similar to inspections, regarding the specific deterrence measures, the analysis tests whether 
enforcement actions taken in the 12 months preceding the current year and enforcement actions taken in 
the 13 to 24 months preceding the current year generate identical coefficient magnitudes. As with 
inspections, F-test statistics fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal coefficients. 
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sector indicators control for variation in facilities’ abilities to control their operations based on 
the type of product being manufactured. The analysis includes two sub-sectoral indicators: 
organic chemical indicator and inorganic chemical indicator, with “other chemicals” as the 
omitted category. 
Second, environmental management, especially labor, may depend on the size of the 
regulated facility. The analysis measures facility size using two proxies: the number of facility 
employees and the NPDES facility classification. The analysis includes a “major facility” 
indicator, with “minor facility” as the omitted category. 
Third, firm ownership structure, as represented by the distinction between publicly held 
and privately held ownership, captures a host of dimensions; for example, facilities owned by 
publicly held firms may possess greater access to external financing for environmentally related 
investment. The analysis includes a publicly held firm indicator, with privately held firm as the 
omitted category. 
The analysis also includes a control factor to capture a facility's economic impact on the 
surrounding community. On one hand, as the impact of a facility rises, the local community may 
apply more pressure on the facility to improve its environmental management. On the other 
hand, as the facility’s size and influence grow, the local community may tread lightly, fearing 
that the facility may shift part of its production to other sites or leave town altogether. The 
included measure reflects a "significant" or "great" economic impact, with a "small" or "very 
little" impact as the omitted category. 
Environmental management may also depend on attitudes of the people associated with 
the regulated facility. The first pair of attitudes is held by facility employees, and the second by 
facility management. Inclusion of these attitudinal measures helps to control for intrinsic 
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motivations to comply with NPDES permits. First, the analysis includes a facility's self-reported 
measure of concern about the environment as reflected in environmental workers’ views. The 
measure ranges between 1 and 10, with 10 signifying the greatest possible concern. As a 
complement, the analysis includes a measure of the environmental concern held by facility 
employees in general (i.e., beyond environmental employees). Facilities employing workers with 
a higher level of environmental concern are expected to be more conscientious about 
environmental management, and thus, employ more environmental employees. These measures 
reflect the non-monetary factors (Z) of the conceptual framework, as described in Section 2.4.2; 
the conceptual element Z rises as these measures grow closer to 10. 
Attitudes of facility management relate to the effectiveness of government interventions 
for inducing compliance with NPDES discharge limits. One attitudinal measure captures 
management’s subjective perception of inspections’ effectiveness. The second attitudinal 
measure captures management’s subjective perception of monetary fines’ effectiveness. Both 
measures are binary, revealing an "effective" perception, with a "not effective" perception as the 
omitted category. If a manager feels that inspections or fines are effective at inducing 
compliance, he/she may be more inclined to practice better environmental management in order 
to stay in compliance. If, however, the manager feels that inspections or fines are ineffective, 
he/she may conclude that hiring employees devoted to environmental management is a waste of 
valuable resources. 
Collectively, these facility-level and firm-level measures are denoted as Fit. 
Finally, the analysis controls for variation in regulatory pressure not already reflected in 
government intervention measures by including EPA regional indicators, denoted as Li, and year 
indicators, denoted as Dt, as regressors. The use of regional indicators controls for “unmeasured” 
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spatial variation in monitoring and enforcement.
29
 The use of year indicators controls for 
“unmeasured” temporal variation. 
2.5.3 Primary Regression Equation 
 The following equation captures the functional relationship between the number of 
environmental employees and the identified explanatory variables: 
Yit = α + δRi + β1Iit-1EPAs + β2Iit-1STs + β3Iit-1EPAg + β4Iit-1STg + β5Ait-1s + β6Ait-1g + β7Pit-1s + 
β8Pit-1g + β9(Ri × Iit-1EPAs) + β10(Ri × Iit-1STs) + β11(Ri × Iit-1EPAg) + β12(Ri ×Iit-1STg) + 
β13(Ri × Ait-1s) + β14(Ri × Ait-1g) + β15(Ri × Pit-1s) + β16(Ri × Pit-1g) + ηFit+ θLi+ μDt + 
εit ,                                 (2.6) 
where β1 through β16 are the coefficients of interest, α represents the intercept term, and εit 
represents an exogenous error term.
30
 The empirical analysis estimates this regression equation 
to obtain coefficient estimates and standard errors of the regressors of interest. 
2.6 Data 
2.6.1 Sources 
To perform the empirical analysis, this study gathers information from a number of data 
sources. Most important, the study draws upon an original survey of regulated facilities in the 
chemical manufacturing industry; see Earnhart and Glicksman (2011) for details. This survey 
includes a series of questions that require the respondents to characterize the nature of their 




 The empirical analysis alternatively estimates a specification using state dummy indicators in 
lieu of regional indicators. The alternative results support the same conclusions reported below. 
30
 I identify the count of environmental employee person-months as the dependent variable. Thus, 
the analysis estimates a linear specification. I expect government interventions and the overall 
enforcement approach to affect the magnitude of environmental labor in an absolute sense, especially 
since I control for the total number of facility employees. 
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relationship and interactions with Clean Water Act regulators.
31
 The survey also gathers data on 
environmental management undertaken by individual facilities, most importantly, the number of 
person-months employees devote to environmental management.
32
 To implement the survey, 
Earnhart and Glicksman (2011) and collaborators identified the proper population based on a full 
extract drawn from the EPA Permit Compliance System (PCS) database, which records 
information on facilities permitted within the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES), as of September, 2001. This extract includes 2,596 chemical facilities. To remain in 
the survey population, facilities needed to meet the following criteria: (1) possessed an NPDES 
permit, (2) faced restrictions on their wastewater discharges, (3) discharged regulated pollutants 
into surface water bodies, and (4) were operating as of 2002. Application of these criteria 
identified 1,003 facilities to contact. Of those facilities contacted between April of 2002 and 
March of 2003, 268 facilities completed at least 90 %
33
 of the survey, implying a 27 % response 
rate. This rate is comparable to previous large-scale surveys of industrial sectors (e.g., Arimura et 
al., 2008) and lies above the average response rate of 21 % as identified by a review of 183 
published studies based on business surveys (Paxson, 1992).  
From this survey, multiple dimensions represent the relationship between the regulator 
and regulated entity, capturing the overall enforcement approach. The dimensions are as follows. 




 The respondents were told their responses would be kept confidential from the regulators. 
32
 To transform the person-month measurement to a count of full-time equivalent (FTE) 
employees, simply divide the person-months by 12. 
33
 The survey includes responses from 268 facilities reflecting three years of environmental 
management, resulting in 804 possible observations. As shown in Table 5, the regression sample contains 
688 observations, as some survey questions were not answered by all respondents. I conduct a difference 
of means test on all non-survey regressors for the initial sample and the regression sample. The test 
statistics reveal no significant differences between the initial and regression samples. 
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The first dimension captures the general relationship between the regulator and the regulated 
facility: (1) generally cooperative or (2) generally coercive. The second dimension captures the 
prevalence of fair treatment of the facility by the regulator: (1) always fair, (2) sometimes fair, or 
(3) always unfair. Environmental regulation is commonly perceived by regulated entities as 
“unfair”; by extension, inflexible enforcement of this regulation might also be perceived as 
“unfair” (Zinn, 2002). More directly, an excessively stringent deterrence-based approach may be 
counterproductive by engendering perceptions that enforcement is “unreasonable” (Faure, 2012; 
Hawkins, 1984). In contrast, a cooperative enforcement approach, which is flexibly 
implemented, should mitigate the perceived unfairness and unreasonableness of regulation and 
enforcement directly. With these perspectives in mind, “always fair” treatment reflects a more 
cooperative approach, while less than “always fair” treatment reflects a more coercive approach. 
The third dimension captures the stability of the relationship as reflected in the assignment of 
regulatory agency officials: the facility typically works (1) with the same individual water 
regulatory official or (2) with multiple regulatory officials that vary with circumstances. 
Typically working with the same individual regulatory official is more likely to facilitate a 
cooperative relationship, while working with multiple regulatory officials is less likely to 
facilitate a cooperative relationship, i.e., more likely to lead to a coercive relationship.
34
 The 
fourth dimension captures the quality of the working relationship as reflected in a facility’s 
decision to seek assistance from the regulator’s supervisor to help with a difference of opinion 
between the facility and the regulator. The absence of a request for assistance reveals a more 




 The presence of multiple regulators does not reflect additional regulatory attention due to poor 
management or weak compliance; instead, this presence reflects the specialization of regulatory oversight 
in certain cases, e.g., certain regulatory personnel understand particular treatment technologies better. 
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cooperative relationship, while the presence of a request reveals a more coercive relationship. 
The fifth dimension also captures the quality of the working relationship but in this case the 
facility may seek assistance from an elected official. Again, the absence of a request reveals a 
more cooperative relationship, while the presence of a request reveals a more coercive 
relationship. The last dimension captures the level of trust supported by the relationship as 
reflected in a facility’s willingness to allow regulators access to plant operations if the regulators 
arrive unannounced. Greater trust reflects a more cooperative relationship, while less trust 
reflects a more coercive relationship.
35
 
From these multiple dimensions, the analysis constructs an index by summing the 
indicators of cooperation presence for each of the enforcement strategy dimensions.
36
 This index, 
ranging between 0 and 6, distinguishes enforcement strategies along a spectrum of coercion-
cooperation. The lowest point on this index, 0, reflects a fully coercive strategy, while the 
highest point, 6, reflects a fully cooperative strategy.
37
 This index, denoted as Ri in the empirical 
specification, represents the empirical counterpart to the conceptual factor of coercive intensity, 
I, even though the index is inversely proportional to this factor. (As shown in the next sub-




 The analysis directly evaluates neither the effects of compliance incentive policies, which 
encourage regulated entities voluntarily to discover, disclose, and correct violations (e.g., Short and 
Toffel, 2008), nor compliance assistance policies, which include outreach, on-site assistance, and 
responses to assistance requests. Instead, the analysis allows these details to be incorporated into the 
measured dimensions of the enforcement approach. 
36
 Principal component analysis reveals that a simple index is sufficient in this case. 
37
 My use of this index is econometrically equivalent to including all of the individual dimensions 
as regressors, while constraining the coefficient magnitudes to equal one another. Moreover, the empirical 
analysis treats the index as a cardinal measure even though it represents a sum of indicators. The 
empirical analysis assesses this treatment by generating and incorporating a separate indicator for each 
level of the index excepting the lowest level. Under the null hypothesis of cardinality, the set of level 
indicator coefficients are equal. F-test statistics fail to reject this null hypothesis. 
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To complement these survey data, the study also collected data from the EPA PCS 
database – information on each facility's (1) location, (2) NPDES major or minor classification, 
and (3) four-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code. The PCS also provides data on 
inspections conducted by federal and state regulators. Both the PCS database and the EPA 
Docket database provide data on federal formal enforcement actions, while only the PCS 
database provides data on informal enforcement actions. The study integrates these two 
databases. 
2.6.2 Statistical Summary 
This sub-section summarizes the data. First, it assesses the enforcement strategy index. 
As shown in Table 2.2, the index is skewed strongly to the right, as a facility's relationship with 
its regulator appears more cooperative than coercive for almost all of the facilities. Nearly 39 % 
of facilities experience a fully cooperative relationship with their regulators, while no facility 
experiences a fully coercive relationship. As a matter of fact, only 2 % of the facilities 
experience a relationship that is more coercive than cooperative (index < 3), with an additional 7 
% of facilities facing a relationship that is a reasonably balanced mix of cooperation and 
coercion (index = 3). Thus, the strongest variation in the index lies at the upper reaches of 
cooperation (index = 4 through 6). Table 2.3 offers a state-specific distribution of the index. The 
distribution shows that the sample contains very limited intra-state variation of the index; 79 % 




 Some of the dimensions underlying the index reflect decisions made by regulated facilities. 




of states possess a coefficient of variation at or below 0.20. Therefore, the index reflects agency 
choices that are not specific to any individual facility but instead common to a given state.  Thus, 
the analysis more strongly relies on variation in the index across states. 
Table 2.4 shows the sample summary statistics of both the primary regressors and control 
factors. Most importantly, the average facility has roughly 75 employee person-months devoted 
to work specifically on environmental management issues. The average cooperation index value 
is 5.01, representing almost full cooperation. 
To explore the intra-facility variation in the dependent variable, the analysis calculates 
the standard deviation of each facility’s person-month count of environmental employees over 
the sample period and then generates summary statistics for this distribution. Based on the set of 
facility-specific values, the average facility-specific standard deviation is 5.25 and the standard 
deviation for the distribution of facility-specific values is 20.82. These two values reveal a 
coefficient of variation of 3.97. These statistics demonstrate considerable variation in the number 
of environmental employee person-months within individual facilities over the sample period. 
Table 2.4 also highlights inspections and enforcement actions. Clearly, state inspections 
are more frequently conducted than federal inspections. The average facility is subjected to 1.5 
state inspections over a 24-month period, yet only 0.07 federal inspections.
39
 Informal actions are 
the most common type of enforcement action. The average facility is subjected to 0.20 informal 
enforcement actions over a 24- month period, while only $ 127 worth of monetary fines. (The 
latter figure reflects a highly skewed distribution of fines involving a few large penalties and 




 Although federal inspections are conducted much less frequently than state inspections in the 
sample, I am able to generate statistically significant results for federal inspections. 
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many 24-month periods without a single fine.)
40
 Finally, Table 2.4 displays the coefficients of 
variation for the regressors; these statistics reveal significant variation in both the primary and 
control regressors. 
2.7 Econometric Analysis 
This section details the econometric analysis used to test the hypotheses presented in 
Section 2.4, by first describing the identification strategy, then discussing estimation techniques, 
and finally interpreting the estimation results, including marginal effects and economic impacts. 
2.7.1 Identification 
This sub-section assesses the potential endogeneity of the key explanatory variables. 
First, some of the elements underlying the enforcement strategy index are potentially 
endogenous since they represent regulated facilities’ decisions, e.g., seek assistance from an 
elected official.
41
 To test for endogeneity, the analysis employs an instrumental variables (IV) 
approach, while identifying first one instrument and then a pair of instruments; the latter is 
needed to statistically test instrument validity. (As noted in sub-section 2.7.2, I address the panel 
data structure using random effects and fixed effects estimators; the test statistics shown here 
stem from the random effects estimator; the fixed effects estimator generates test statistics that 
support identical conclusions.) As the primary instrument, the analysis uses maturity of a state’s 
NPDES program, which reflects the number of days since the state obtained primacy over the 
NPDES program. This instrument should be relevant (i.e., helps to determine the level of 




 Even though monetary fines occur infrequently in the sample, I am able to generate statistically 
significant results for fines. 
41
 However, the lack of intra-state variation of the index shows that the enforcement strategy 
reflects agency choices that are not specific to any individual facility but instead common to a given state. 
Regardless, I test for endogeneity of the index. 
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cooperation-coercion on the overall enforcement strategy index) since states with a long tenure 
of experience regulating facilities have more time to craft more cooperative relationships. The 
first stage estimates of the IV estimation procedure, shown in Table B.1 of the appendix, help to 
assess the impact of state permitting primacy on the potentially endogenous regressor, 
conditional on the covariates identified above. These first stage estimates reveal that the primary 
instrument appears relevant, given an F-test statistic of 55.05, which clearly rejects the null 
hypothesis of a zero effect (p=0.000). 
The analysis needs two instruments to test for validity, i.e., the instruments are 
orthogonal to the error process (Baum et al., 2003). For this testing, the analysis decomposes the 
state-level primacy measure into two components: an indicator of state primacy and the length of 
time possessing primacy conditional upon obtaining primacy.
42
 This pair of instruments also 
appear relevant, given a partial F-test statistic of 28.11, which rejects the null hypothesis of zero 
effect (p=0.000). Conditional upon the second stage including the effects of regulatory approach, 
monitoring inspections, and enforcement actions, I argue that primacy has no direct effect on the 
extent of environmental employment provided by CWA-regulated facilities. In other words, all 
of the impacts of primacy relevant to environmental employees are channeled through the 
regulatory approach, inspections, and enforcement. As statistical evidence, I employ the Sargan-
Hansen Test of Overidentifying Restrictions; the test statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis 
that the two instruments are valid (p=0.550). 
Since two instruments appear both relevant and not invalid, the analysis conducts a 
Hausman test of exogeneity to assess whether the enforcement strategy index appears 




 Although these two instruments are related, I argue that both are necessary to test for validity. 
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endogenous. The Hausman Test statistic of 0.381 fails to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity 
(p=0.537). Thus, use of IV estimation does not appear warranted based on the use of the 
enforcement strategy index as the key primary regressor. 
Government interventions may also be endogenous. However, this study claims that the 
constructed measures are indeed exogenously determined with respect to environmental labor 
decisions. The general deterrence measures are clearly exogenous, as they are prompted by the 
behavior and performance of other facilities. The specific deterrence measures should be 
exogenous as well given the separation in time between lagged government interventions and 
current environmental management decisions, consistent with nearly all previous studies using 
lagged intervention measures (Earnhart, 2009; Helland, 1998a; Helland, 1998b; Earnhart and 
Leonard, 2013; Earnhart and Harrington, 2014). As one of the very few studies to assess the 
endogeneity of lagged intervention measures, Earnhart and Friesen (2014) demonstrate that 
specific deterrence measures appear exogenous. By the principle of transitivity, interactions 
between the enforcement strategy index and government intervention measures should be 
exogenous as well. Finally, government intervention measures are potentially endogenous in the 
first stage estimation where the enforcement strategy index represents the dependent variable. 
However, the study claims these measures are exogenous given the separation across decision 
makers – inspectors, agency attorneys, and judges – described in Section 2.3 and depicted in 
Figure 2.1, and the separation over time as government monitoring moves to enforcement 
proceedings to judicial decisions. 
Since all of the regressors appear exogenous, the empirical analysis proceeds by 
employing the standard estimation procedures. 
68 
 
2.7.2 Estimation Techniques 
To address the panel structure of the sampled data, the empirical analysis employs the 
standard panel data estimation techniques of random effects and fixed effects estimation. To test 
whether or not the random effects estimates are consistent, the study conducts a Hausman Test of 
Random Effects. The test statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis that random effects estimates 
are consistent (p=0.621). The conclusions supported by the estimation results are robust to the 
choice of estimator. To demonstrate this point, Table 2.5 displays both the random effects 
estimates and fixed effects (i.e., facility indicators included) estimates based on the broadest set 
of regressors. 
To assess further the robustness of the results, the analysis includes three models (i.e., 
regressor sets). The first is the parsimonious model (Model 1), which excludes all control factors. 
The second model adds the year and regional indicators (Model 2). The full model includes all of 
the control factors (Model 3). The next sub-section primarily uses the full model estimates to 




This sub-section interprets the results generated from both random effects and fixed 
effects estimation, which are found in Table 2.5. Due to the inclusion of interactions, I only 
briefly discuss the main coefficients and interaction coefficients, while reserving substantial 
discussion for the marginal effects of the primary regressors. 




 As an alternative specification, standard errors are clustered at the state level. The resulting 




The main coefficients for the government intervention measures identify the marginal 
effects when the overall enforcement approach index equals 0, i.e., a fully coercive strategy. This 
level of the index does not occur in the sample of data. Therefore, the following effects are 
interpreted as projections for a completely coercive regulatory regime, which is feasible given 
the substantial discretion granted to environmental protection agencies. The estimation results 
show that four types of government interventions significantly affect a facility’s count of 
environmental employees under these conditions. The effects of federal inspections – both in 
general and specific deterrence form – are significantly positive. The effect of monetary penalties 
based on specific deterrence is also significantly positive. These interventions therefore induce 
better environmental management under a fully coercive strategy. As described in Section 2.5, 
these particular interventions are considered more severe than others. As expected, the less 
severe measures, namely state inspections and informal actions, do not generate a positive effect. 
While the effects of state inspections on environmental management do not prove statistically 
significant under coercion, the general deterrence effects of informal actions prove statistically 
negative. 
This sub-section next assesses how the effectiveness of interventions changes as the 
enforcement strategy moves away from coercion and towards cooperation by examining the 
interaction coefficients. These coefficients reveal the effect of increasing the enforcement 
strategy index by one step on the slope coefficient associated with each intervention type. The 





 Thus, federal inspections become more effective as the enforcement 
strategy becomes more coercive, which supports Hypothesis H2. Next, the interaction between 
informal enforcement actions and the enforcement strategy is significantly positive for general 
deterrence. Thus, less severe enforcement actions become more effective at inducing stronger 
environmental management as the strategy moves toward cooperation, which supports 
Hypothesis H3. Finally, the interaction between monetary penalties and the enforcement strategy 
is significantly negative for specific deterrence. Similar to federal inspections, monetary 
penalties, which represent more severe enforcement actions, become less effective as the 
enforcement strategy becomes more cooperative. Put differently, penalties become more 
effective as the enforcement strategy becomes more coercive; this result supports Hypothesis H3. 
Not surprisingly, the measures with insignificant main coefficients also generate insignificant 
interaction coefficients. 
Before assessing marginal effects under less than fully coercive conditions, this sub-
section discusses the coefficient estimates involving control factors. This discussion focuses on 
effects statistically different from zero. 
Consider facility characteristics. First, facility size, as proxied by the number of total 
workers employed at a facility, positively affects the amount of environmental employees 
working at a facility. Intuitively, larger facilities need better environmental management in order 
to remain compliant. Second, facilities owned by publicly held firms employ a higher number of 




 Some states during the sample period had yet to be granted authority to implement the NPDES 
program (“primacy”). For these states, federal inspections were the only type of inspection available 
during the sample period. Dropping these states from the analysis does not meaningfully change the 
estimated effects of federal inspections. 
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workers devoted to environmental management. As noted in Section 2.5, publicly held firms are 
more visible in the eyes of various stakeholder communities, e.g., customers, investors (Arora 
and Cason, 1995), so these firms might tend to hire more environmental employees at their 
facilities. Third, the economic impact of a facility has a significantly positive effect on the 
amount of environmental labor employed. This result reveals that local communities place more 
pressure, not less, on more visible facilities. Interestingly, none of the attitudinal measures prove 
statistically significant. 
In order to check the robustness of these conclusions, the analysis assesses the results 
from the three models and two panel data estimators. Estimates from the three models support 
identical conclusions with a single exception in the case of monetary penalties in specific 
deterrence form. The significantly positive effect relies upon the full set of controls. As noted 
above, the random effects and fixed effects estimates are highly similar; in particular, they 
support identical conclusions relating to the primary regressors and nearly identical conclusions 
relating to the control factors. 
2.7.4 Marginal Effects 
To determine the effects of government interventions on the count of facility-level 
environmental employee person-months under varying conditions of coercion/cooperation, this 
sub-section explores the marginal effects generated by the regression estimates. Tables 2.6 and 
2.7 display the marginal effects for specific deterrence and general deterrence measures, 
respectively, while Figures 2.2 through 2.5 display the 90% confidence intervals for the set of 
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government interventions. This exploration of marginal effects represents a test of the 
hypotheses derived in Section 2.4.
45
 
Hypothesis H2 focuses on the contrast between federal and state inspections based on the 
notion that federal inspections are more severe than state inspections. The generated marginal 
effects appear to support this hypothesis. Under a completely coercive model (index = 0), federal 
EPA inspections have a positive impact on environmental management, while state inspections 
have no significant impact. Moreover, as shown in Figure 2.2, the federal impact of specific 
deterrence remains significantly positive until the enforcement approach index rises to four (out 
of six), being statistically zero thereafter, while the federal impact of general deterrence remains 
significantly positive until the enforcement approach index rises to two, after which the impact is 
statistically zero. Further, as shown in Figure 2.3, both the specific and general forms of state 
inspections remain statistically insignificant as the enforcement approach index rises above 0, 
indicating greater and greater cooperation. When moving from a coercive relationship to a 
cooperative one (moving down the rows in Tables 2.6 and 2.7), the differential between the 
marginal effects of federal and state inspections falls, consistent with a “dulling” of the intrinsic 
motivation to comply, as reflected in Hypothesis H2. 
Next, the marginal effects of enforcement follow a pattern similar to that of inspections, 
but with two major differences. Contrary to state inspections, the less severe form of 
enforcement – informal actions – generates significantly negative marginal effects when the 
strategy is fully coercive. As shown in Figure 2.4, this effect is significant until the index rises to 




 I note again that marginal effects based on an index value of 0 (fully coercive approach) 
represent projections for a fully coercive strategy, which does not occur in the sample but is feasible given 
the great discretion granted to regulatory agencies. 
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2, after which the effect is statistically zero. In contrast, the marginal effect of the more severe 
enforcement measure – monetary penalties – is significantly positive under a fully coercive 
strategy and remains so until the index rises to 4, which is slightly cooperative. However, as 
shown in Figure 2.5, the marginal effect of penalties becomes significantly negative once the 
enforcement strategy is sufficiently high – index values of 5 and 6, which represent almost fully 
and fully cooperative relationships, respectively. Whereas for inspections the loss in intrinsic 
motivation lowers the positive impact of deterrence, for penalties, the loss in intrinsic motivation 
overwhelms the impact of deterrence under sufficiently strong cooperation. Therefore, both 
informal actions and penalties, which differ considerably in severity, prompt a loss in intrinsic 
motivation that overwhelms the positive effect of deterrence dependent upon which side of the 
cooperation spectrum regulators act. 
Based on the assessed marginal effects, this sub-section reassesses the hypotheses derived 
in Section 2.4. Hypothesis H1 demonstrates that the effectiveness of government interventions 
depends on the level of cooperation vs. coercion. As shown in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, the generated 
marginal effects for certain interventions support this hypothesis. The effects of federal 
inspections (both specific and general deterrence), informal actions (only general deterrence), 
and monetary penalties (only specific deterrence) depend significantly on the level of 
cooperation. Thus, the extent of cooperation/coercion influences most types of intervention. 
Under sufficiently coercive conditions, the more severe interventions positively impact 
environmental management. However, under sufficiently cooperative conditions, inspections 
lose their effectiveness, while fines appear to generate so much ill will that they become counter-
productive. Conversely, for less severe intervention types, namely state inspections and informal 
actions, the opposite is true. Under full cooperation, these interventions have no effect on 
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environmental management. However, the mismatch of using an informal enforcement action 
under full coercion proves counter-productive by actually decreasing environmental labor. 
Collectively, these results demonstrate that effective monitoring and enforcement relies upon 
interventions with “teeth” conducted under coercive conditions. Matching the severity of the 
government intervention with the enforcement strategy is especially important for enforcement 
actions, as a mismatch actually causes facilities to decrease the amount of environmental workers 
employed. 
The second set of hypotheses, H2, deals with the effectiveness of federal versus state 
inspections. Consistent with H2, federal inspections, the more severe inspection type, positively 
affect environmental management only under sufficiently coercive conditions. However, the 
reverse relationship does not hold for the less severe state inspections: state inspections are not 
more effective under more cooperative conditions. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show these results in the 
third through sixth columns. 
The third set of hypotheses, H3, focuses on the comparison across the types of 
enforcement. Matching enforcement type and regulatory approach helps to improve the 
effectiveness of enforcement. The more severe action of penalty imposition produces a positive 
environmental management effect under a sufficiently coercive approach and a negative effect 
under a sufficiently cooperative one, consistent with H3. Partially consistent with H3, the less 
severe enforcement type, informal action, proves ineffective under both coercive and cooperative 
conditions. Whereas monetary penalties prove effective under full coercion and counter-
productive under full cooperation, the opposite does not hold true for informal enforcement 
actions. Informal enforcement actions prove effective at reducing environmental labor under a 
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fully coercive strategy and prove simply ineffective under a fully cooperative strategy. Tables 
2.6 and 2.7 display the results for these hypotheses in the final four columns. 
In sum, the empirical results support the coercive model: greater coercion improves the 
effectiveness of government interventions but only for the more severe types of interventions. 
2.7.5 Economic Impacts 
This last sub-section assesses the economic significance of the reported estimates while 
focusing exclusively on the statistically significant effects. In the current economic climate, 
where environmental regulation is oftentimes on the chopping block of federal and state budgets, 




The average facility employs 75 employee person-months devoted to environmental 
management. When matching an extra federal inspection to a fully coercive enforcement 
strategy, based on specific deterrence, a regulator can increase the number of environmental 
employee person-months by 28 (equivalent to 2.33 FTE employees), which represents a 37 % 
increase in the count of person-months for environmental workers at the average facility.  (One 
extra federal inspection represents three sample standard deviations.) Based on general 
deterrence, using this same match, a regulator can increase the number of environmental 
employee person-months by 88 (equivalent to 7.33 FTE employees), which represents a 117 % 
increase for the average facility. For enforcement actions, both types generate a significant 
impact on environmental employment. Based on general deterrence, mismatching an extra 




 This analysis cannot demonstrate whether or not increases in environmental labor displace 
other forms of labor employed by regulated facilities. However, this analysis shows that, in the very least, 
greater monitoring and enforcement can increase labor in one regard. 
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informal enforcement action with a fully coercive strategy decreases the amount of 
environmental employment by 40 person-months (equivalent to 3.33 FTE workers), which 
represents a 53 % drop in the use of environmental labor. On the other hand, matching an 
increase in the monetary penalty level with a fully coercive strategy leads to more environmental 
workers based on specific deterrence. Specifically, an increase of $ 1000 raises the number of 
environmental employee person-months by 43 (equivalent to 3.58 FTE employees), which 
represents a 57 % increase for the average facility. (A $ 1000 increase represents roughly 28 % 
of one sample standard deviation). However, under a fully cooperative strategy, a $ 1000 
increase in the monetary fine level generates the opposite effect: a decrease of 9 employee 
person-months devoted to environmental management (equivalent to 0.75 FTE workers), which 
represents a 12 % decrease for the average facility. 
2.8 Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to determine the effect of regulator approach on 
government interventions on the use of environmental management. The analysis examined 
chemical manufacturing facilities permitted under the NPDES program, for the years 1999-2001. 
The analysis finds that under a sufficiently coercive approach, the more severe government 
interventions – federal inspections and monetary penalties – positively affect environmental 
management; yet less severe government interventions – informal enforcement actions – 
negatively affect environmental management, specifically, environmental labor. However, once 
the approach moves sufficiently toward cooperation, these effects become statistically zero for 
federal inspections and informal enforcement actions and significantly negative for monetary 
fines. Conversely, the less severe type of inspections – state inspections – do not affect 
environmental employment, no matter the overall enforcement approach. 
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These results highlight three main points: (1) the coercive or cooperative nature of the 
regulator’s enforcement approach matters when analyzing the efficacy of government 
interventions at inducing better environmental management, (2) to improve (and not decrease) 
environmentally related employment, the regulator must match government intervention severity 
with the overall enforcement approach, and (3) the imposition, as well as the enforcement, of 
environmental regulations affect employment at permitted facilities. 
As important, based on these results, I conclude that cooperation does not appear 
“innovative”. In general, greater cooperation undermines the effectiveness of government 
interventions once the analysis includes control factors, especially for the more substantive types 
of intervention, namely federal inspections and monetary fines. Moreover, under strategies that 
are more cooperative than coercive, all types of government interventions prove ineffective at 
best. In the worst case, greater cooperation leads to counter-productive effects for monetary 
fines. Thus, I conclude that, in the chemical manufacturing sector during the sample period, the 
cooperation extended by regulators is not innovative but perhaps regulatory capture. 
In closing, this study adds much to the debate over the optimal environmental regulatory 
policy, both in terms of regulator approach and type of intervention to pursue. Of course, the 
need for future research on this important question remains. This study explores only one sector; 
in order to understand better the effect of regulator approach, future research should explore 
more sectors. Further, this study examines only one element of the compliance landscape: 
environmental management in the form of environmental workers. Although this element is 
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extremely important, future research should examine actual levels of compliance, as determined 
























 This study could have explored the level of compliance of facilities, but this exploration would 
have reduced the sample size substantially; only major facilities in the NPDES system are required to 
report discharges. By exploring environmental labor as the dependent variable, this study exploits data on 
both types of facilities in the sample: majors and minors. 
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Table 2.1: Coercive v. Cooperative Relationship Elements Used to Construct the 
Regulatory Approach Index 





How likely is the facility to allow 
unannounced visits from the regulator? 
Trust 
“Somewhat 























What is the general relationship between 







Did the facility request assistance from 
the regulator’s supervisor? 






Did the facility request assistance from 
elected officials? 









Table 2.2: Regulatory Approach Index 
Approach Index Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
0 0 0.00 0.00 
1 3 0.40 0.40 
2 12 1.61 2.01 
3 51 6.83 8.84 
4 135 18.07 26.91 
5 255 34.14 61.04 





Table 2.3: State-Specific Distribution of Regulatory Approach Index 
State Mean Std. Dev. 
Coef. of 
Variation 
    
Alaska 5.00 0 0 
Connecticut 6.00 0 0 
Kansas 6.00 0 0 
Maine 5.00 0 0 
Montana 6.00 0 0 
Oklahoma 4.00 0 0 
Oregon 6.00 0 0 
Utah 4.00 0 0 
Wisconsin 6.00 0 0 
Minnesota 5.50 0.55 0.01 
North Carolina 5.50 0.55 0.01 
Virginia 5.50 0.55 0.01 
West Virginia 5.20 0.41 0.08 
Delaware 5.67 0.50 0.09 
Nebraska 5.67 0.50 0.09 
Washington 5.67 0.50 0.09 
Maryland 5.60 0.51 0.09 
South Carolina 5.40 0.51 0.09 
South Dakota 4.50 0.55 0.12 
Tennessee 5.40 0.68 0.13 
Arkansas 5.14 0.66 0.13 
Texas 4.59 0.69 0.15 
Mississippi 4.80 0.78 0.16 
Iowa 4.87 0.80 0.16 
California 5.50 0.91 0.17 
New York 5.50 0.91 0.17 
Pennsylvania 5.35 0.91 0.17 
Alabama 5.45 0.98 0.18 
New Jersey 4.79 0.96 0.20 
Louisiana 4.60 0.92 0.20 
Rhode Island 5.00 1.01 0.20 
Illinois 5.00 1.13 0.23 
Georgia 5.40 1.24 0.23 
Ohio 5.13 1.22 0.24 
Kentucky 4.29 1.06 0.25 
Massachusetts 5.25 1.34 0.26 
Missouri 4.20 1.21 0.29 
Indiana 5.00 1.60 0.32 




Table 2.4: Sample Summary Statistics 




    
Environmental employees (person-month count) 74.74 178.9 2.394 
    
Primary Regressors 
    
Regulatory enforcement approach index: 
    fully coercive (= 0) to fully cooperative (= 6) 
5.008 1.026 0.205 
No. federal inspections / No. other facilities per region (1-yr lag) 0.029 0.050 1.754 
No. state inspections / No. other facilities per region (1-yr lag) 0.674 0.966 1.433 
No. federal inspections during preceding 24-month period 0.068 0.330 4.825 
No. state inspections during preceding 24-month period 1.491 2.472 1.658 
No. informal enforcement actions / No. other facilities per 0.077 0.190 2.477 
    region (1-yr lag)    
Penalty amount / No. other facilities per region (1-yr lag) 73.68 366.0 4.967 
No. informal enforcement actions during preceding 24-month period 0.200 1.168 5.840 
Penalty amount during preceding 24-month period 127.5 3,571 28.01 
    
Interactions between Regulatory Enforcement Approach and Government Interventions 
    
Enforcement approach index × federal inspections (general) 0.147 0.265 1.803 
Enforcement approach index × state inspections (general) 3.492 5.234 1.499 
Enforcement approach index × federal inspections (specific) 0.348 1.677 4.819 
Enforcement approach index ×state inspections (specific) 8.008 14.07 1.757 
Enforcement approach index × informal actions (general) 0.383 0.945 2.467 
Enforcement approach index ×penalty amount (general) 357.99 1,770.56 4.946 
Enforcement approach index × informal actions (specific) 0.855 4.976 5.820 
Enforcement approach index × penalty amount (specific) 687.75 18,524.4 26.93 
    
Facility Characteristics 
    
Major facility classification (vs minor facility) 0.384 0.487 1.268 
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs other chemicals) 0.437 0.496 1.135 
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs other chemicals) 0.310 0.463 1.494 
Facility owned by publicly-held firm (vs privately-held firm) 0.634 0.482 0.760 
Facility employees (count) 259.9 480.9 1.850 
Economic impact of facility: significant/great (vs small/very little) 0.710 0.454 0.639 
Facility’s attitudes toward inspection effectiveness:  
     effective (vs not effective) 
0.529 0.500 0.945 
Facility's attitudes toward monetary fine effectiveness: 
     effective (vs not effective) 
0.393 0.489 1.244 
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Table 2.4 (continued) 
    
    
Facility's environmental concern - all employees: 
     1=lowest, 10=highest 
7.378 1.704 0.231 
Facility's environmental concern - environmental employees: 
     1=lowest, 10=highest 
8.896 1.331 0.150 
    
Year/Region Controls 
    
EPA Region 1 (0,1) [regions 8, 9, 10 omitted] 0.034 0.180 5.357 
EPA Region 2 (0,1) [regions 8, 9, 10 omitted] 0.090 0.286 3.192 
EPA Region 3 (0,1) [regions 8, 9, 10 omitted] 0.131 0.337 2.573 
EPA Region 4 (0,1) [regions 8, 9, 10 omitted] 0.246 0.431 1.752 
EPA Region 5 (0,1) [regions 8, 9, 10 omitted] 0.164 0.371 2.262 
EPA Region 6 (0,1) [regions 8, 9, 10 omitted] 0.220 0.415 1.886 
EPA Region 7 (0,1) [regions 8, 9, 10 omitted] 0.067 0.250 3.720 
Year 2000 (0,1) [Year 1999 omitted] 0.333 0.472 1.417 
Year 2001 (0,1) [Year 1999 omitted] 0.333 0.472 1.417 
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Table 2.5 (continued) 
 
Facility Controls 
     
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs 
other chemicals) 
  -0.941 
(0.973) 
 
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs 
other chemicals) 
  -19.68 
(0.339) 
 
Facility employees (count)   0.0435  
   (0.014)  
Facility owned by publicly-held firm (vs 
privately-held firm) 
  21.91 
(0.046) 
 
Economic impact of facility: 
significant/great (vs small/very little) 
  37.07 
(0.055) 
 
Facility's attitudes toward inspection 
effectiveness: effective (vs not 
effective) 




Facility's attitudes toward monetary fine 
effectiveness: effective (vs not 
effective) 




Facility's environmental concern - 
environmental employees  
  9.820 
(0.425) 
 
Facility's environmental concern - all 
employees 
  -7.356 
(0.515) 
 
Constant 89.65 17.72 -25.37 57.52 
 (0.141) (0.738) (0.644) (0.000) 
     
Number of Observations 703 703 688 688 
Year indicators included No Yes Yes Yes 
Regional indicators included No Yes Yes No 
Facility indicators included No No No Yes 
     
 
Notes: 
p-values are shown in parentheses. 
Bold text identifies coefficients that are significant at the 90 % level or better (p ≤ 0.10). 
Standard errors are clustered at the facility level. 
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Table 2.6: Marginal Effects of Government Interventions on Environmental Labor: 
Specific Deterrence 
Regulatory % of Fed Inspections State Inspections Informal Actions Penalty Amount 
Index Sample Magnitude p-value Magnitude p-value Magnitude p-value Magnitude p-value 
0 0.0 28.56 0.072 0.507 0.776 -1.80 0.581 0.043 0.034 
1 0.4 22.12 0.069 0.532 0.714 -1.77 0.470 0.034 0.035 
2 1.6 15.68 0.063 0.558 0.622 -1.74 0.304 0.026 0.035 
3 6.8 9.25 0.054 0.583 0.477 -1.71 0.125 0.017 0.037 
4 18.1 2.81 0.088 0.609 0.263 -1.68 0.109 0.008 0.041 
5 34.1 -3.63 0.262 0.634 0.101 -1.66 0.291 -0.0003 0.001 
6 39.0 -10.07 0.139 0.660 0.171 -1.63 0.480 -0.009 0.026 
 
 
Table 2.7: Marginal Effects of Government Interventions on Environmental Labor: 
General Deterrence 
Regulatory % of Fed Inspections State Inspections Informal Actions Penalty Amount 
Index Sample Magnitude p-value Magnitude p-value Magnitude p-value Magnitude p-value 
0 0.0 88.66 0.073 -0.413 0.941 -40.62 0.047 -0.0008 0.908 
1 0.4 67.88 0.071 -0.612 0.888 -31.96 0.051 -0.0011 0.836 
2 1.6 47.10 0.073 -0.811 0.795 -23.30 0.062 -0.0014 0.720 
3 6.8 26.32 0.115 -1.01 0.611 -14.65 0.105 -0.0017 0.540 
4 18.1 5.53 0.676 -1.21 0.312 -5.99 0.377 -0.0020 0.385 
5 34.1 -15.25 0.433 -1.41 0.337 2.67 0.701 -0.0023 0.418 
6 39.0 -36.03 0.227 -1.61 0.516 11.33 0.231 -0.0026 0.515 
 

























President, governors appoint agency 
directors 
 
Agency directors implement overall 
enforcement strategy 
 
Low-level agency employees conduct 
inspections at and bring informal 
enforcement actions against facilities, with 
much discretion 
 
Lawyers at agencies initiate administrative 
proceedings or refer cases to Dept. of 
Justice, with much discretion 
 
Administrative or civil judges decide on 
imposition of formal sanctions 
 
Figure 2.1: National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Monitoring and Enforcement 
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3 The Effect of Regulatory Enforcement on Facility-Level Employment: 
Environmental Workers vs. Production Workers 
3.1 Introduction 
 Economists and policy-makers debate whether or not jobs and environmental protection 
are mutually exclusive. Environmental regulation imposes additional costs on regulated facilities, 
which may pass these costs onto workers by cutting jobs or lowering wages (or both). This pass-
through represents backward cost-shifting onto labor. The debate over the impact of 
environmental regulation on employment has proven especially fierce in today’s political 
environment where environmental protection budgets are under attack. The debate remains 
because the empirical literature on the labor effects of environmental regulation provides 
ambiguous conclusions. Almost all empirical studies find a statistically negligible effect 
(Morgenstern et al., 2002; Ferris, et al., 2014) or negative effect (Greenstone, 2002; Walker, 
2011) on the number of employees in an industry or at an individual facility. To contribute to this 
policy debate, this study examines the effects of environmental regulation, specifically its 
enforcement, on three labor outcomes: total employment, production employment, and 
employment dedicated to environmental management (hereafter “environmental employment”). 
Previous empirical studies of labor explore the imposition of environmental regulation. 
However, imposition is only the first step in protection of the environment through regulation. 
After an environmental regulation is imposed, continued effort in the form of enforcement is 
necessary to ensure facilities’ compliance with any regulation (Helland, 1998a; Helland, 1998b; 
Earnhart, 2004a; Earnhart, 2004b; Gray and Shimshack, 2011). Environmental enforcement 
takes place in the form of various government interventions: monitoring inspections, informal 
enforcement (e.g., warnings), and formal enforcement (e.g., monetary penalties). Absent 
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compliance, environmental regulation imposes no costs on regulated facilities. By ensuring 
compliance, enforcement imposes real costs on facilities. As compliance rises, compliance costs 
also grow. Moreover, enforcement directly imposes costs through the use of monetary fines or 
indirectly imposes costs by distracting regulated facilities through inspections or enforcement 
proceedings. Thus, greater enforcement leads to higher non-compliance costs and eventually 
higher compliance costs. However, no previous study examines the employment effect of 
environmental enforcement. This study fills this void by examining the effect of Clean Water 
Act enforcement on employment at regulated facilities within the U.S. chemical manufacturing 
sector. 
Within the economic literature on the employment effect of environmental regulation, 
most studies note that pollution abatement activities require some amount of labor input 
(Morgenstern et al., 2002; Ferris, et al., 2014). In fact, Morgenstern et al. (2002) claim that 
environmental regulation may actually increase labor. However, these studies are unable to 
quantify this type of labor, as data on environmental employment only exist in aggregate form 
(Department of Commerce, 2010; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011).
48
 This study is able to 
examine two types of labor – environmental and production – using data from a unique survey 
that specifically instructs respondents to quantify separately these two labor types. Simply put, 
environmental employees engage in environmental management, which includes any method 
used by facilities to control pollution, e.g., environmental self-audits, internal monitoring 
protocols, end-of-pipe treatment technologies. In the studied sample, the presence of 
environmental employees is substantial, representing nearly 5 % of the average facility’s 




 These aggregate data reflect estimates rather than actual measures of labor. 
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workforce. In contrast to environmental workers, production workers engage in production 
activities. 
By combining the two types of laborers, this study estimates an overall employment 
impact of environmental enforcement at regulated facilities. More importantly, this study 
distinguishes by labor type, estimating a separate effect of enforcement on environmental 
employees and production employees. Both results represent contributions to the empirical 
literature on the link from environmental regulation to employment. 
To produce these contributions, the study first estimates the effects of various types of 
government interventions on the overall number of workers employed at a regulated facility. 
This first contribution provides insight on the overall impact of enforcing the Clean Water Act. 
Depending on the type of government intervention, the empirical results show that 
environmental enforcement has a negative or zero effect on the total number of workers 
employed at regulated facilities. 
Of course, each overall impact reflects the net result from two countervailing forces. 
Theoretically, greater enforcement should spur more employment of environmental workers, as 
noted above, yet possibly prompt regulated facilities to shed production workers. To discern 
these two effects, the empirical analysis jointly estimates a system of equations with the two 
types of labor as separate dependent variables. The empirical results reveal that government 
interventions generally increase the employment of environmental workers or have no 
meaningful effect, while government interventions decrease the employment of production 
workers or have no meaningful effect. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the pertinent literatures. 
Section 3.3 describes Clean Water Act regulation of the chemical manufacturing sector. Section 
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3.4 constructs a theoretical framework, which generates empirically testable hypotheses. Section 
3.5 describes the econometric framework. Section 3.6 discusses the data and provides summary 
statistics. Section 3.7 details the econometric analysis and reports the empirical results, while 
interpreting them in light of the theoretically derived hypotheses. Section 3.8 concludes and 
assesses briefly future research. 
3.2 Literature Review 
 This study contributes to three distinct economic literatures. First and most important, 
this study contributes to the growing literature on the labor impact of environmental regulation. 
Second, the study contributes to the literature on the public enforcement of environmental laws, 
which examines the effects of various government interventions on decisions made at 
environmentally regulated facilities. Finally, this study contributes to the literature on 
environmental management, of which environmental labor is one important form. 
3.2.1 Labor Impacts of Environmental Regulation 
 The economic literature examining the labor impacts of environmental regulation is 
important, yet surprisingly thin. All previous studies examine the labor impacts of the imposition 
of regulations at either the level of an individual facility or individual industry. First, 
Morgenstern et al. (2002) examine the employment effects of greater environmental spending at 
the industry level of four key industries: pulp and paper mills, plastic manufacturers, petroleum 
refineries, and iron and steel mills. The authors find that increased environmental spending does 
not cause a significant change in employment. Walker (2011) examines the changes in 
employment as a result of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. He finds that firms respond 
to the imposition of this environmental regulation by eliminating jobs. Greenstone (2002) finds 
that the Clean Air Act’s designation of attainment vs. non-attainment counties has significant 
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labor impacts in multiple manufacturing sectors. Berman and Bui (2001) examine the stringency 
of air quality regulation in the Los Angeles area. They find that regulatory stringency has no 
significant employment effects. Gray et al. (2014) study the impact of the Cluster Rule on 
employment in the pulp and paper industry. They find minimal effects on the number of 
employees at facilities subject to the rule. Sheriff, et al. (2015) examine the employment effects 
of the Clean Air Act’s Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards on the U.S. electric power 
sector. Finally, Ferris et al. (2014) find negligible employment effects when examining the effect 
of Phase I of the Title IV SO2 trading program on fossil fuel-fired plants’ employment. 
3.2.2 Public Enforcement of Environmental Laws 
A related literature explores the enforcement of environmental laws. As the seminal 
study, Becker (1968) provides the theoretical foundation for the public enforcement of laws 
including environmental laws. In this foundational study, the enforcement agency monitors the 
compliance of regulated facilities and deters non-compliance by threatening to impose sanctions 
in response to violations. Since this seminal work, a number of theoretical studies have expanded 
Becker’s basic model; Polinsky and Shovell (2000) thoroughly review this theoretical literature. 
As important, numerous empirical studies explore the enforcement of public laws, which 
include environmental laws. This review focuses on the environmental studies. The majority of 
empirical environmental studies analyze the effect of environmental enforcement on facility- or 
firm-level environmental performance, e.g., compliance, or management, e.g., self-audits (Gray 
and Shadbegian, 2004; Shimshack and Ward, 2005; Gray and Deily, 1996; Laplante and 
Rhilstone, 1996; Earnhart, 2004a; Earnhart, 2004b; Earnhart and Segerson, 2012). Gray and 




3.2.3 Environmental Management 
A third large literature examines the environmental management decisions of regulated 
facilities. Given the empirical thrust of the present study, this review focuses on previous 
empirical studies. Many studies examine a facility's decision to establish and possibly certify an 
environmental management system (EMS). While several certification avenues are available, 
many facilities obtain certification based on commercial standards, such as the ISO 14001 
standard. Arimura et al. (2008), Nakamura et al. (2001), Dasgupta et al. (2000), Henriques and 
Sadorsky (2007), Delmas and Toffel (2008), and Mori and Welch (2008) examine facilities' 
adoption of ISO 14001-certified EMSs. Whether or not they are part of an EMS, numerous 
environmental management tools are available to facilities. Several studies analyze specific types 
of environmental management. Khanna and Anton (2002), Anton et al. (2004), and Harrington et 
al. (2008) examine companies’ decisions to implement various environmental management 
practices including pollution prevention practices, measured as a count. Khanna et al. (2007), 
Jones (2010), Ervin et al. (2012), Garcia et al. (2009), and Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) 
analyze companies' decisions to implement specific environmental management practices, each 
measured separately. Other studies focus on one particularly policy-relevant environmental 
management practice: environmental self-audits (Earnhart and Leonard, 2013; Evans et al., 2011; 
Earnhart and Harrington, 2014). 
3.2.4 Contributions of Present Study 
This study contributes to these literatures in two ways. First, this study examines 
separately the effects of environmental regulation on two distinctively different forms of labor: 
production labor and environmental labor. Previous labor studies identify the need for labor 
when conducting pollution abatement activities (e.g., Morgenstern et al., 2002). However, the 
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publicly available microdata do not allow empirical studies to examine separately the 
employment effects by labor activity. Second, this study examines the effect on employment 
from the enforcement of environmental regulation rather than the imposition of regulation. No 
previous published study explores this link. 
3.3 Clean Water Act Regulation of Wastewater from the Chemical Manufacturing Sector 
3.3.1 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
This study examines facility behavior prompted by environmental regulation, specifically 
the Clean Water Act (CWA). The CWA’s main purpose is to protect water quality. To this end, 
the CWA controls wastewater discharges from point sources.
49
 The EPA created the National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) to control these point source discharges. The 
system’s main form of control is the issuance of facility-specific permits, which identify the 
pollutant-specific discharge limits imposed on regulated facilities.
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To establish discharge limits within individual facilities’ permits, the issuing agency 
considers any relevant Effluent Limitation Guideline standard and water quality-based standard. 
The former is designed to require a minimum level of wastewater treatment for a given industry 
and the latter is designed to ensure that the water body receiving the discharges meets ambient 
surface water quality standards. After a potential discharge limit is calculated under each 
standard, the permitting agency writes the stricter of the two into the permit. 




 Point sources directly discharge into a waterbody, usually from a pipe or outfall, or indirectly 
discharge into a municipal wastewater collection system. In contrast, non-point sources generate 
discharges diffusely through run-off from agricultural fields, urban settings, or construction sites into a 
waterbody. This study focuses on point sources. 
50




The permitted discharge limit represents a performance-based standard. Compliance with 
this standard is based on a facility’s own discharges. Thus, each facility is able to use any 
available abatement method to comply with its permitted limit. A number of abatement methods 
are available to facilities: end-of-pipe treatment technologies (i.e., capital), deployment of labor, 
and other methods. 
NPDES-permitted facilities are required to monitor and self-report their discharges on a 
regular basis. Therefore, inspections are not needed to assess compliance with imposed discharge 
limits. More important, inspections cannot measure this type of compliance because limits 
constrain discharges measured over a period of time, e.g., entire month. Inspections can only 
measure the concentration of pollution in a discharge stream at a moment in time. 
To ensure compliance with permits, the EPA and authorized state agencies periodically 
inspect facilities and take enforcement actions when the facility is not in compliance. Agencies 
possess great discretion over monitoring and enforcement decisions. Thus, environmental 
enforcement activity can vary considerably over time and across administrations. In the NPDES 
program, authorized state agencies are the primary party responsible for monitoring and 
enforcement, even though the EPA retains authority to inspect and impose sanctions on facilities 
as well. Inspections represent the main monitoring activity. Regulatory agencies use inspections 
as a vehicle for gathering evidence for future enforcement actions (Wasserman, 1984). In 
addition, agencies oftentimes use inspections to offer compliance assistance. As needed, agencies 
use a mixture of informal enforcement actions, such as warning letters, and formal enforcement 
actions, including monetary penalties (i.e., fines), to deter non-compliance. 
Conceptually, monitoring inspections and enforcement actions create both specific and 
general deterrence. Specific deterrence is the pressure to comply generated when a specific 
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facility itself is subjected to a government intervention. Specific deterrence prompts the 
particular facility to improve its subsequent compliance. General deterrence, on the other hand, is 
the pressure to comply based on government interventions taken against other facilities. Thus, 
general deterrence prompts other facilities to improve their subsequent compliance (Cohen, 
2000). Collectively, when an agency conducts an inspection at or takes an enforcement action 
against a particular facility, this facility faces greater specific deterrence and other facilities face 
greater general deterrence. These two forms of deterrence imply that each facility bases it 
perceptions of enforcement likelihood and severity on its own experiences (specific deterrence) 
and other facilities’ experiences (general deterrence). [General deterrence stems only from other 
facilities who are seen by the particular facility as sufficiently similar to serve as peers for the 
purpose of updating the facility’s perceived likelihood of a future government intervention and 
perceived magnitude of any future government intervention, e.g., fine size.] 
3.3.2 Chemical Manufacturing Sector 
Point sources of wastewater fall into one of two main categories: municipal sources (i.e., 
municipal wastewater treatment facilities) and industrial sources.
51
 This study focuses on a single 
sector, chemical manufacturing, which falls into the industrial sources category. The focus on a 
single industrial sector is consistent with other empirical studies of industrial pollution (e.g., 
Laplante and Rilstone, 1996; Barla, 2007; Earnhart, 2009; Earnhart and Harrington, 2014). 
For a number of reasons, the chemical manufacturing sector serves as a good choice for 
analyzing the employment effects of government interventions. First, the EPA has shown a 








strong interest in this sector. The EPA and the Chemical Manufacturing Association (CMA) 
jointly authored a study on the causes of non-compliance in the chemical manufacturing sector 
(EPA, 1999). Further, the EPA solely studied the compliance history of facilities operating in 
this sector (EPA, 1997). Second, the EPA considered two sub-sectors in the industry (industrial 
organics and chemical preparations) as priority sectors during a portion of the study period. 
Third, the CMA (now known as the American Chemistry Council [ACC]) has demonstrated a 
strong interest in promoting pollution reduction and prevention with its Responsible Care 
initiative. Fourth, wastewater data disaggregated by 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) code reveal that four of the 10 highest polluting sub-sectors operated in the chemical 
manufacturing sector as of 2008 (EPA, 2011); this evidence demonstrates that the chemical 
manufacturing sector is very important in terms of total wastewater. Finally, the chemical 
manufacturing sector employs many environmental workers and even more production workers. 
The average facility in the sample allocates roughly 5 % of its workers to perform tasks 
specifically related to environmental management. Further, according to the BLS, the chemical 
manufacturing sector had almost 25,000 environmental workers employed across the industry as 
of 2011. This figure represents roughly 5 % of the total environmental employment in the 
manufacturing industry, which makes the chemical manufacturing sector the most “green” 
employer of all aggregated sectors (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). 
3.4 Conceptual Framework 
This section constructs a simple theoretical model from which the study derives 
empirically testable hypotheses relating to the effects of enforcement on the two specific types of 
labor – environmental and production – and labor in general. 
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3.4.1 The Effects of Government Interventions on Overall Labor 
 Hypothesis H1a: The effect of government interventions on overall facility-level labor is 
positive. 
 The environmental enforcement literature states that government interventions, in the 
form of inspections or enforcement actions, are used by the regulating agency to achieve 
compliance with issued discharge permits (Earnhart, 2004a; Earnhart, 2004b; Shimshack and 
Ward, 2011). Further, the environmental management literature states that in order to achieve or 
increase compliance, regulated facilities partake in numerous environmental management 
techniques (e.g., ISO 14001 certification performing environmental self-audits), especially after 
experiencing inspections and enforcement actions (Delmas and Toffel, 2008; Earnhart and 
Leonard, 2013; Earnhart and Harrington, 2014). In addition to these standard EMS practices, 
facilities hire environmental workers to ensure compliance with their permitted allowable 
discharges, and these employees have proven successful at generating compliance (Earnhart and 
Glicksman, 2011). Therefore, Hypothesis H1a proposes that when a regulating agency conducts 
inspections and imposes enforcement actions at a facility, the recipient of the interventions will 
hire environmentally related workers in order to achieve compliance with their permits. For H1a 
to hold, this increase in the amount of environmental workers must be paired with the managerial 
decision to keep the number of production workers unchanged, or only slightly decreased.
52
 
 Hypothesis H1b: The effect of government interventions on overall facility-level labor is 
zero or negative. 




 A discussion of the effects on different types of workers is provided in the following section. 
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 Alternatively, managers may respond to government interventions in a negative way. All 
previous studies of the effects of environmental regulation on overall labor find a negative effect 
(Walker, 2011; Greenstone, 2002) or a statistically negligible effect (Ferris, et al., 2014; Gray et 
al., 2014) on employment outcomes. H1b is based on the idea that environmental regulation (its 
imposition as well as its enforcement), especially fines, impose additional costs on facilities. In 
order to meet these costs, managers must cut costs in other areas of operation, including wages. 
Therefore, in order to cut labor costs, managers must lay-off workers to remain profitable. Under 
H1b, managers are still expected to increase the number of environmental workers, as this is 
necessary to achieve compliance once the facility is subjected to government interventions. 
However, H1b differs from H1a in that this increase in environmentally related employment is 
offset by the decrease in production labor. Under H1b, after experiencing government 
interventions, the overall facility-level employment numbers experience a net decrease or no 
change. Therefore, H1b does not hypothesize the sign of the change in labor types, rather that the 
magnitudes of the labor type changes are different enough to cause a decrease in overall facility-
level employment. 
3.4.2 The Effects of Government Interventions on Different Types of Labor 
Hypothesis H2: The marginal effect of an increase in the number of firm environmental 
workers is a decrease in the number of production workers.
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 Conversely, the marginal effect of a decrease in the number of firm environmental workers is 
an increase in the number of production workers. However, this is not expected to be the case, as 
government interventions are expected to increase environmental management, and thus, the number of 
environmental workers employed at a facility. 
104 
 
Consider a price-taking, competitive firm
54
 that employs two types of substitutable labor: 
environmental workers, Le, and production workers (i.e., non-environmental workers), L.
55
 The 
firm must pay each worker a wage, w, depending on the type of work performed by that 
employee. In each time period, each individual firm faces environmental regulations, imposed within 
its NPDES permit, with which it must comply. For the theoretical model, I denote this standard 
level of allowable discharges as ?̅?. Therefore, the firm produces two products: (1) the final 
product to be sold at market, Q, and (2) the environmental product, i.e. the act of complying with 
the standard set by the regulating agency, denoted E.
56
 Because the two types of employees are 
substitutes, each final product is produced by its respective employee type (e.g., environmental 
employees produce the environmental product). To represent the two products produced by the 
firm in each time period, consider the following two downward-concave production functions: 
Q = ln (L)                                                                                                                                     (3.1) 
 E =𝐿𝑒
𝑏
 , where 0 < b < 1.           (3.2) 
For each firm, I assume that only Q can produce profits, with a final product price of p. Because 
of this assumption, the environmental product only enters the firm’s profit equation as a cost, as 
the firm must employ environmental labor exclusively to avoid violation (i.e., avoid exceeding 
its permitted level of discharges, ?̅?), not to increase its profits. Thus, each firm attempts to 
maximize its profit function, Π: 




 I assume that each firm owns a single facility. Therefore, no difference exists between the firm 
and the facility. 
55
 Because the two types of labor are substitutes, the amount of total employees at each firm, LT, 
is equal to the sum of environmental and production workers: LT = Le + L. 
56
 An increase in each type of labor is associated with an increase in production of the respective 
product. Therefore, the hiring of more production workers, L, results in a higher quantity of Q, and the 
hiring of more environmental workers, Le, results in a higher quantity of E.  
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 Π = p * ln (L) – wL – wLe .                                                                                                       (3.3) 
In this firm, production and environmental workers perform explicitly different tasks, and thus, 
supply and demand for each labor type result in wages that depend on the worker. Therefore, I 
will allow the wage, w, to depend on the type of labor by substituting w = L + Le into the profit 
function. Finally, I substitute Le = E
1/b
 into the profit function. This allows each firm to solve its 
profit maximization problem: 
 max Π = p * ln (L) – (L + E 1/b)*L – (L + E 1/b)* E 1/b .                                                    (3.4) 
Once the firm solves its maximization problem in Equation (3.4), it is evident that the marginal 
effect of an increase in environmental labor is a decrease in production labor.
57
  
As mentioned in Hypothesis H1a, the purpose of government interventions is to induce 
compliance, which is the environmental good E in this model. Thus, when firms experience 
government interventions (such as monetary fines), they are expected to increase production of 
the environmental good, and in order to do so, hire more environmental workers, Le. Therefore, 
this theoretical result shows that if firms are subjected to a government intervention, they will 
hire more environmental workers, which in turn will cause the firm to decrease the number of 
substitutable production workers. 
3.5 Econometric Framework 
 This study examines the effects of Clean Water Act enforcement on facility-level 
employment. The study first estimates the effects of government interventions on the total 
number of full-time equivalent (FTE) workers at each facility, regardless of the specific job-




 The complete derivation can be found in Appendix C. 
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related function in which these workers participate. The study then jointly estimates the effects 
of environmental enforcement on two types of employees: environmental employees and 
production employees. This section proceeds by first discussing the dependent variables, then the 
primary and control regressors, and then by constructing the regression equations. 
3.5.1 Dependent Variables 
In each year t, facility i chooses its level of environmental workers, denoted Y1it, and its 
level of production workers, denoted Y2it, which sum to the overall level of workers: Yit = Y1it + 
Y2it. In order to determine the effects of government interventions on facility-level employment, 
the analysis estimates the relationship between each of these three dependent variables and a set 
of primary regressors and control factors, as described below. 
3.5.2 Primary Regressors 
The primary regressors are measures of environmental enforcement, i.e., government 
interventions, namely inspections and enforcement actions. The regressors separately measure 
federal inspections and state inspections and separately measure informal actions and monetary 
penalties. Similar to some previous studies (Earnhart, 2009; Earnhart and Segerson, 2012), the 
study includes only federal enforcement actions, while excluding state enforcement actions, 
since no database provides complete information for state enforcement actions. Second, the study 
splits government interventions into two categories: government interventions against one's own 
facility (specific deterrence) and government interventions against other facilities that are similar 
to one's own (general deterrence). 
The study constructs the government intervention regressors in the following way. First, 
the study constructs the inspection measures. For specific deterrence, the analysis uses the 
number of federal or state inspections conducted in the 24 months preceding the current year at 
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 For general deterrence, the 
analysis uses the number of federal or state inspections conducted in the 12 months preceding the 
current year at other facilities of similar NPDES facility status operating in the same EPA region, 
in the case of federal inspections, and in the same state, in the case of state inspections, divided 
by the number of similar status facilities operating in the same EPA region or state (Earnhart and 




, respectively. The NPDES program distinguishes 
between major facilities and minor facilities; this distinction reflects the NPDES facility status. 
Next, the analysis constructs the enforcement measures in a way similar to that of 
inspections. The resulting specific deterrence measure for informal actions is denoted as Ait-1
s
, 
while the general deterrence measure is denoted as Ait-1
g
. For the penalty measures, the analysis 
uses the total amount of penalties levied against the individual facility or other facilities. The 







3.5.3 Control Factors 
The analysis creates and includes as controls factors derived from facility- and firm-level 
characteristics, as well as local community characteristics, that may influence employment.  
First, the industrial sub-sector in which a facility operates may impact labor decisions. 
Facilities’ abilities to control their operations – both environmental and production – may depend 




 For the inspection-related specific deterrence measures, the study tests whether inspections 
conducted in the 12 months preceding the current year and those conducted in the 13 to 24 months 
preceding the current year generate identical coefficient magnitudes. F-test statistics fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of equal coefficients. 
59
 For the enforcement-related specific deterrence measures, the study tests whether enforcement 
actions taken in the 12 months preceding the current year and enforcement actions taken in the 13 to 24 
months preceding the current year generate statistically identical coefficient estimates. F-test statistics fail 
to reject the null hypothesis of equal coefficients. 
108 
 
on the type of product being manufactured. The analysis includes two indicators to control for 
variation in this ability: one indicator for organic chemicals and another indicator for inorganic 
chemicals, with “other chemicals” as the omitted category. 
Second, the age of a particular facility may impact the optimal number of workers 
employed, either in an environmental or production capacity. The analysis includes facility age 
as a control factor. One can expect that the older a facility is the more helpful are environmental 
employees for keeping the facility compliant with its NPDES permits. Similarly, as facility age 
rises, production employees become more helpful at maintaining the older equipment. 
Third, firm ownership structure, as represented by the distinction between publicly held 
and non-publicly held ownership, captures a number of firm-related influences. For example, 
publicly held firms may possess greater access to external financing for environmentally related 
investment. Therefore, the analysis includes a publicly held firm indicator. 
The analysis also includes control factors to capture a facility's relationship with the 
surrounding community. The first measure captures the economic impact of the facility on the 
surrounding community. On one hand, as the impact of a facility rises, the local community may 
apply more pressure on the facility to improve its environmental management. On the other 
hand, as the facility’s size and influence grow, the local community may tread lightly, fearing 
that the facility may shift part of its production to other sites or leave town altogether. The 
included measure reflects a "significant" or "great" economic impact, with a "small" or "very 
little" impact as the omitted category. Second, the analysis includes a control factor that 
measures the direct relationship of the facility with community leaders. The analysis includes an 
indicator that represents whether or not facility management has met with community leaders to 
discuss the environmental impact of the facility on the local community. This measure controls 
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for attitudes that community leaders may hold in regard to whether or not they believe the 
facility is making a conscious effort to be environmentally aware, or if the facility management 
are environmentally aware. If facility leadership decides to make a concerted effort to meet with 
community leaders, the community may be less inclined to pressure the regulator to bring 
interventions upon the facility, which may result in the use of less environmental employees at 
the facility. On the other hand, a facility that is proactive enough to meet with community leaders 
may be more inclined to practice better environmental management, as they are clearly 
concerned with their environmental impact on the community. 
The number of overall employees and the allocation of workers between environmental 
management and production may also depend on the attitudes of the people associated with the 
regulated facility. One control factor captures a facility’s environmental workers’ self-reported 
measure of concern about the environment. The measure ranges between 1 and 10, with 1 
signifying the least concern and 10 signifying the greatest concern. This attitudinal measure 
should help to control for variation in workers’ intrinsic motivation to comply with NPDES 
permits. 
Two other control factors reflect facility managers’ attitudes towards the effectiveness of 
government interventions for inducing compliance with discharge limits. One measure captures 
management’s subjective perception of inspections’ effectiveness, while the second measure 
captures management’s subjective perception of monetary fines’ effectiveness. Both measures 
are binary, representing an "effective" perception, with a "not effective" perception as the 
omitted category. If a manager feels that inspections or fines are effective at inducing 
compliance, he/she may be more inclined to hire more environmental workers. If, however, the 
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manager feels that inspections or fines are ineffective, he/she may conclude that hiring 
employees devoted to environmental management wastes resources. 
Collectively, these facility- and firm-level measures are denoted as Fit. 
 The use of environmental employees as a means of achieving compliance at a given 
facility may also depend on local community characteristics (Earnhart, 2004b). Community 
characteristics are only expected to influence environmental employees as these characteristics 
proxy for the extent of pressure exerted by local communities on facilities to exhibit better 
pollution control, i.e., deliver better local environmental quality. In contrast, I expect no link 
from local community characteristics to production employees. 
 The analysis exploits county-level measures of local community characteristics. All 
monetary measures are inflation-adjusted into 2002 dollars. The first community characteristic is 
per capita personal income. Higher income communities are more likely to apply pressure on 
local facilities to practice better environmental management (e.g., by hiring more environmental 
workers) since environmental quality is a normal good (Earnhart, 2004c). Second, the analysis 
controls for local labor market conditions using two proxies: (1) the unemployment rate, and (2) 
the number of wage and salary jobs in the community. A local community is more likely to 
pressure facilities to provide better environmental quality when the unemployment rate is low or 
the number of individuals earning a salary or wages is high. Conversely, communities facing 
economically difficult times are more likely to focus on economic growth than environmental 
quality. Finally, population density is correlated with the local community pressure placed on a 
facility to improve local environmental quality by conducting better environmental management, 
e.g., employ more environmental workers. In a community where individuals are more densely 
populated around a polluting facility, the local community is more likely to urge the facility to 
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generate less pollution; hiring more environmental employees reduces pollution (Earnhart and 
Glicksman, 2011). 
 These community-level characteristics are collectively denoted as Cit. 
Finally, the analysis controls for variation in regulatory pressure not already reflected in 
government intervention measures by including time dummies, denoted Dt, and EPA regional 
indicators, denoted as Li. The use of regional indicators controls for “unmeasured” spatial 
variation in monitoring and enforcement. 
3.5.4 Functional Relationships 
The analysis first estimates the functional relationship between overall workers and the 
set of primary and control factors. The analysis estimates a semi-log specification by log-
transforming the dependent variable, as is standard with studies of employment. This 
specification facilitates easy interpretation of the coefficients: a one unit increase in each 
regressor is associated with a percentage change in total employment. The following empirical 
specification captures the functional relationship to estimate: 
f(Yit) = γ + δ1Iit-1EPAs + δ2Iit-1STs + δ3Iit-1EPAg + δ4Iit-1STg + δ5Ait-1s + δ6Ait-1g + δ7Pit-1s +  
δ8Pit-1g  + ηFit + τCit + μLi + θDt + εit,                     (3.5) 
where δ1 through δ8 are the coefficients of interest, γ represents the intercept term, and εit 
represents an exogenous error term. 
 Next, the analysis jointly estimates the relationships between each labor type and the set 
of primary and control regressors. Again, the analysis estimates a semi-log specification by log-





f(Y1it) = α0 + α 1Iit-1EPAs + α2Iit-1STs + α3Iit-1EPAg + α4Iit-1STg + α5Ait-1s + α6Ait-1g + α7Pit-1s +  
α8Pit-1g  + α9Fit + α10Cit + α11Li +  α12Dt  + ε1it                                (3.6) 
f(Y2it) = β0 + β1Iit-1EPAs + β2Iit-1STs + β3Iit-1EPAg + β4Iit-1STg + β5Ait-1s + β6Ait-1g + β7Pit-1s +  
β8Pit-1g  + β9Fit + β10Li + β 11Dt  + ε2it ,                            (3.7) 
where α1  through α8  and β1 through β8 are the coefficients of interest, α0 and β0 represent the 
intercept terms, and ε1it and ε2it represent the correlated error terms. 
 The analysis jointly estimates this system of equations using seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) (Zellner, 1962), which is helpful for two reasons. First, SUR allows for 
correlation between the two error terms. Therefore, SUR facilitates proper cross equation 
restriction testing (Wooldridge, 2002, pg. 185-191). The analysis explores cross equation 
restrictions in order to test hypotheses comparing coefficients between the two equations, as 
described below. Second, SUR generates efficiency gains for the coefficient estimates over 
estimating the equations separately using OLS. If the two equations contain exactly the same set 
of regressors, then joint estimation generates coefficient magnitudes and standard errors no 
different from those generated by estimating each equation separately using OLS. However, if 
the regressor set differs between the equations, then the SUR estimates are more efficient than 
the OLS estimates (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, pg. 294-295). As mentioned in sub-section 
3.5.3, local communities pressure facilities only to generate better environmental quality by 
conducting more environmental management; local community characteristics proxy for this 
environmental pressure. In contrast, local communities are not expected to exert pressure on 
facilities for more production workers. Accordingly, the analysis includes the set of local 
community characteristics as regressors only in the estimation of overall and environmental 
employees – Equations (3.5) and (3.6), excluding these characteristics from the estimation of 
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The study draws upon three main data sources to gather the information necessary to 
conduct the empirical analysis. First, the study draws upon a survey of regulated facilities in the 
chemical manufacturing industry.
60
 The survey chiefly gathers data on environmental 
management undertaken by individual facilities. Most importantly, the survey separately gathers 
information on the number of environmental and production employees at each facility. The 
survey also gathers information about each facility’s attitudes toward government intervention 
effectiveness. 
Between April 2002 and March 2003, the survey was administered by phone to all 
chemical manufacturing facilities permitted within the NPDES program as of September, 2001 
(2,596 facilities) that met the following criteria: (1) faced restrictions on their wastewater 
discharges, (2) discharged regulated pollutants into surface water bodies, and (3) were operating 
as of 2002. [The EPA Permit Compliance System (PCS) database identified all NPDES-
permitted facilities operating in the chemical manufacturing sector.] Of the 2,596 permitted 
facilities, 1003 met the identified criteria. Of the 1003 facilities contacted for the survey, 268 
completed the survey, implying a 27 % response rate. This rate is comparable to other large-scale 
surveys of industrial sectors (e.g., Arimura et al., 2008). Also, this response rate is higher than 
the average response rate for similar surveys of 21 % (Paxson, 1992). 




 See Earnhart and Glicksman (2011) for specific details regarding the survey. 
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In addition to these survey data, the study uses data from the EPA PCS database. 
Specifically, the study uses information on each facility's location and four-digit standard 
industrial classification (SIC) code. The study also uses data on inspections conducted by both 
federal and state regulators. The PCS database and also the EPA Docket database provide data 
on federal formal enforcement actions, while only the PCS database provides data on informal 
enforcement actions; the study integrates data from the two sources. 
3.6.2 Statistical Summary 
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for the dependent variables, the primary regressors, 
and the control factors. As shown, the average facility employs roughly 259 workers in total. 
Further, the average facility employs six individuals to work specifically on environmental 
management issues and 256 individuals to work on production. 
Table 3.1 also identifies key summary statistics for the primary regressors. As shown, 
state agencies conduct inspections much more frequently than EPA regional offices conduct 
inspections. This is to be expected since state agencies are primarily responsible for monitoring. 
The average facility is subjected to 1.5 state inspections over a 24-month period, yet only 0.07 
federal inspections.
61
 For enforcement actions, the more common action is the less severe of the 
two types. The average facility is subjected to 0.20 informal enforcement actions over a 24-
month period, yet is fined only $ 127. (The latter figure reflects a highly skewed distribution of 
fines involving a few large penalties and many 24-month periods without a single fine.)
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 Although federal inspections are conducted much less frequently than state inspections in the 
sample, the empirical analysis generates statistically significant results for federal inspections. 
62
 Even though monetary fines occur infrequently in the sample, the empirical analysis generates 
statistically significant results for fines. 
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Finally, in order to display the meaningful variation of the primary regressors, Table 3.1 displays 
the coefficients of variation for the government intervention measures. 
3.7 Econometric Analysis 
3.7.1 Potential Endogeneity of Government Interventions 
The decision by the regulating agency to inspect and levy enforcement actions on 
facilities may be endogenous. Regulating agencies may target facilities with poor records of 
compliance as the recipients of government interventions, in the hopes that the facility will 
improve compliance, which should result in hiring more environmental labor. However, this 
study claims that the constructed measures are exogenously determined with respect to overall, 
environmental, and production labor decisions. 
First, the general deterrence measures are clearly exogenous. These measures reflect 
government interventions prompted by the behavior and performance of other facilities. Second, 
the specific deterrence measures are exogenous due to the separation in time between lagged 
government interventions and current employment and environmental management decisions, 
consistent with nearly all previous studies using lagged intervention measures (Earnhart, 2009; 
Helland, 1998a; Helland, 1998b; Earnhart and Leonard, 2013; Earnhart and Harrington, 2014). A 
comprehensive review of the environmental enforcement literature confirms that all previous 
empirical studies treat lagged interventions as exogenous (Gray and Shimshack, 2011). As such, 
the analysis proceeds treating all regressors as exogenous. 
3.7.2 Regressor Sets 
The analysis considers three models in order to assess the robustness of all estimated 
results with respect to the choice of regressor sets. Model 1 is the parsimonious model, which 
includes only the eight primary regressors. Model 2 adds regional indicators and facility and firm 
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characteristics as control factors. Model 3 additionally includes the set of local community 
characteristics as control factors except in the case of the production employee equation. 
Inclusion of these last control factors generates efficiency gains when using SUR to estimate 
jointly the system of equations. Given this feature, the study treats Model 3 as the primary model 
using Models 1 and 2 for assessing the robustness of the results. 
3.7.3 Estimation Techniques 
 This section discusses the estimation techniques utilized to find the effects of government 
interventions on labor. This study uses a number of estimation techniques but treats one type of 
technique – the between-group estimator – as the primary technique. Still the study assesses the 
robustness of the results with respect to the choice of estimation technique. In other words, by 
employing various estimators, the analysis is able to assess the robustness of the estimates. 
 To identify the effects of government interventions on overall employment levels at 
chemical manufacturing facilities, the analysis utilizes three estimation techniques. Each 
estimator either addresses or exploits the panel nature of the data, which offers annual data over 
the three-year period between 1999 and 2001. To exploit the panel data structure, the analysis 
employs two standard panel data estimators: fixed effects estimation and random effects 
estimation. A Hausman Test of Random Effects shows that the random effects estimates are 
consistent (p=0.588). Consequently, the analysis interprets both sets of estimates. The remaining 
estimators merely address the panel data structure. One technique estimates the pooled data using 
OLS, i.e., pooled OLS, while clustering at the facility level. A second technique uses OLS to 
estimate separately individual year-specific cross-sections of the panel data. The final technique 
implements a between-group estimator by averaging each dependent and independent variable 
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by facility across the three panel years and using OLS to estimate the functional relationship 
based on the set of average values. 
 As explained below, the study focuses on the between-group estimator. Table 3.2 reports 
these estimates. Appendix Tables D.1 and D.2 report, respectively, the fixed effects and random 
effects estimates, and pooled OLS with clustering at the facility level estimates. Moreover, the 
analysis downplays the year-specific estimates because certain government intervention types 
occur quite infrequently. For example, the EPA imposed no monetary fines against the sampled 
facilities in the 24-month period preceding both 1999 and 2000; thus, some specific deterrence 
measures lack variation. 
 As with overall labor, the analysis employs various techniques to estimate environmental 
labor and production labor. The ideal estimator both exploits the panel data structure and jointly 
estimates the system of equations using SUR. Random effects SUR fits these two criteria. The 
Stata user-written XTSUR command implements random effects SUR, however, this command 
does not implement fixed effects SUR.
63
 This command does not facilitate the Hausman Test of 
Random Effects, which assesses whether or not the random effects estimates are consistent. 
Based on random effects estimation of the two equations separately, the Hausman Test of 
Random Effects statistics indicates that the random effects estimates are consistent for one of the 
two equations. The associated test p-values are 0.883 and 0.012 for the environmental employee 
and production employee equations, respectively. Consequently, the random effects estimates for 
production labor are admittedly inconsistent. 




 Because of the large number of facility-level indicators necessary to run fixed effects 
regression using XTSUR, the command is unable to provide fixed effects estimates at all. 
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To assess the robustness of the results, the study implements additional estimators that 
meet one of the two criteria identified for the ideal estimator. One of the alternative estimators 
only exploits the panel data structure: fixed effects estimation of the two regression equations 
separately. Other alternative estimators only jointly estimate the two regression equations using 
SUR while addressing the panel data structure in various ways: pooled SUR estimation, year-
specific cross-section SUR estimation, and between-group SUR estimation. Of these last three 
estimators, the between-group SUR estimator provides the most reasonable balance; this 
estimator uses the panel data by exploiting the three-year averages, unlike the year-specific 
cross-sections, while avoiding any concern about omitted variable bias, unlike pooled SUR. 
Similar to the estimation of overall employees, the analysis again downplays the estimates of the 
year-specific cross-sections of data, as some specific deterrence measures lack sufficient 
variation. 
 The study tests cross equation hypotheses stemming from pairwise comparisons of the 
government intervention coefficients between the two labor-specific equations. For example, the 
federal inspection specific deterrence coefficient from the environmental labor equation equals 
its counterpart from the production labor equation, i.e., α1 = β1. Joint estimation of the two-
equation system is critical for properly testing these hypotheses when the two equations’ error 
terms are correlated. Error term correlation implies that joint estimation is needed to address the 
covariance between coefficients derived from the two individual regression equations. Breusch-
Pagan Tests of Residual Independence assess whether or not the error terms are correlated. As 
the null hypothesis, the error terms are not correlated. As shown in Table 3.3, all of the Breusch-
Pagan Test statistics derived from between-group SUR estimation strongly reject the null 
hypothesis of uncorrelated error terms (p=0.000). As shown in Appendix Table D.5, the 
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Breusch-Pagan Test statistic also rejects the null hypothesis of uncorrelated error terms for the 
alternative joint estimator. Thus, joint estimation is warranted for the cross equation hypothesis 
testing. 
 Collectively, this assessment leads me to focus on the between-group estimator because it 
generates at least consistent and unbiased estimates, exploits the panel data to some extent, and 
facilitates proper testing of cross equation hypotheses within a SUR framework when jointly 
estimating the system of equations reflecting environmental labor and production labor. 
Table 3.3 reports the between-group SUR estimates. Appendix Tables D.3 through D.5 
report the fixed effects estimates, random effects SUR estimates, and pooled SUR estimates 
respectively. The year-specific cross-section SUR estimates are available upon request. 
3.7.4 Results 
 This sub-section interprets the primary results stemming from between-group estimation. 
The next sub-section interprets the alternative estimation results in order to assess the robustness 
of the results with respect to the choice of estimator. 
3.7.4.1 Overall Labor 
 First, this sub-section interprets the between-group estimates for overall labor, which are 
shown in Table 3.2. The estimated effects of government interventions on overall labor support 
conclusions similar to those conclusions supported by the estimated effects of environmental 
regulation on employment from all previous empirical analyses. The results show that, of the 
four types of interventions, which are split into two deterrence forms, all are statistically zero or 
significantly negative. These results collectively support Hypothesis H1b: government 
interventions either negatively affect overall employment or not at all. This support shows that, 
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although government interventions may increase the use of environmental workers, any decrease 
in production workers neutralizes or dominates this increase. 
 Of the government interventions examined, estimation results reveal that seven of the 
eight types have a statistically zero effect on the number of overall workers. Federal inspections, 
state inspections, informal enforcement actions (in both specific and general deterrence form) 
and monetary penalties (for general deterrence) do not cause a facility to change its overall level 
of labor. The noted specific deterrence measures do not necessarily carry direct monetary 
consequences. Instead, these specific deterrence measures merely reflect indirect costs and an 
increase in the likelihood or magnitude of a future monetary sanction. Based on the estimates, 
managers do not meaningfully alter their chosen levels of overall employment levels in response 
to consequences stemming from inspections or informal enforcement. General deterrence 
measures reflect only increases in the threat of receiving the associated type of intervention. 
Based on the estimates, these threats do not prompt managers to change their chosen levels of 
overall employment. In stark contrast, monetary fines reflected in the specific deterrence 
measure directly generate costs. Not surprising, the effect of this factor on overall employment is 
significantly negative. Thus, when facilities must pay a monetary fine for their poor 
environmental performance, facilities cut labor in general. 
3.7.4.2 Environmental and Production Labor 
 The previous results, in the case of zero employment effects, fail to provide information 
on whether managers respond at all when the regulating agency decides to intervene. A 
statistically zero effect of interventions on overall labor, as is almost exclusively the case, only 
shows that the overall level of employment does not change at a facility as a result of 
interventions. However, both the environmental management and labor effects of regulation 
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literatures provide evidence that environmental regulation may in fact increase labor in one 
regard. Therefore, it is important to examine what causes the statistically negligible effects seen 
in the literature and in the previous sub-section. 
While consistent with the previous studies on the effect of environmental regulation on 
labor, the estimated effects of government interventions on overall labor masks the theoretically 
derived countervailing effects of government interventions on the two types of labor: 
environmental and production. To assess these countervailing effects, this sub-section interprets 
the between-group SUR estimates shown in Table 3.3. 
 The estimation results reveal that three of the eight deterrence measures significantly 
affect the number of environmental employees at regulated facilities, while only one of the eight 
measures significantly impact the number of production employees. As mentioned, the purpose 
of environmental enforcement is to induce facility compliance with NPDES discharge limits 
through better environmental management, including an increase in the number of environmental 
workers. Model 3 results, shown in Table 3.3, demonstrate this point for two of the three 
significant interventions: federal inspections and monetary penalties in general deterrence form. 
Interestingly, informal enforcement actions in the form of general deterrence decrease 
environmental workers. This counter-intuitive result is found in the empirical literature. Some 
previous empirical studies of environmental enforcement generate counter-intuitive results for 
general deterrence (e.g., Stafford, 2003; Earnhart, 2004b). 
If facilities perceive that regulatory agencies face a fixed budget, enforcement actions 
taken against other similar regulated facilities actually reduce the resources available to take 
enforcement actions against one’s own facility. Consequently, a facility manager feels “the storm 
has passed” with other facilities taking the hit; accordingly, the threat of a future intervention 
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drops, prompting the facility manager to reduce the extent of environmental management, 
including the use of environmental workers. 
Thus, the perception of a fixed regulatory budget helps to explain the negative effect of 
informal enforcement-based general deterrence on environmental labor. Symmetrically, this 
logic explains any positive effect of informal enforcement-based general deterrence on 
production labor. To capture this logic, the theoretical framework could be modified to examine 
the perceived fine imposed on non-compliant discharges. As the perceived fine falls, due to the 
“passing storm”, the facility chooses to reduce environmental labor and raise production labor 
because the relative price of marketable production rises. 
 This sub-section next interprets the results from estimating the dependent variable of 
production employees. Although the great majority of government intervention effects are 
statistically zero, production employee numbers see only a decrease as a result of environmental 
enforcement. Monetary penalties in specific deterrence form negatively affect the number of 
production workers. The direct extraction of monetary resources prompts managers to scale back 
production labor. 
 The preceding results support Hypothesis H2 for some but not all of the government 
interventions examined. As described in Section 3.4, Hypothesis H2 states that the effects on the 
number of environmental workers and the number of production workers after government 
interventions have an inverse relationship. Specifically, when assuming that an intervention 
results in the increased use of environmental workers in order to achieve compliance, this causes 
a decrease in the number of production workers. Hypothesis H2 is supported by those 
interventions with zero effect on either type of worker, as the need for more environmental 
product (i.e., compliance) does not occur, and thus, there is no need to decrease production labor. 
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Hypothesis H2 is also supported by those interventions where the signs for environmental and 
production workers are opposites, although empirical results do not show this to occur in the 
sample.
64
 For federal inspections and monetary penalties in general deterrence form, this inverse 
relationship does not necessarily hold. For these interventions, the positive relationship between 
the two inspection types and environmental employees is expected, but this is not matched by a 
decrease in production employees. For these interventions, it appears as though managers feel 
the need for additional compliance is necessary, but the lack of a monetary component to these 
interventions does not compel managers to cut back on production labor. Finally, the expected 
negative relationship between monetary fines in specific deterrence form and production workers 
is not accompanied by a positive increase in environmental employees. This is caused by the 
extreme need of managers to decrease input costs by all means. Therefore, the need to decrease 
the number of production workers to meet bottom line targets is not met with the motivation to 
increase compliance. Additionally, monetary fines are extremely rare and severe, and their 
imposition may invoke a loss of manager intrinsic motivation to comply with NPDES permits. 
 Next, this sub-section discusses collectively the effects of environmental enforcement on 
overall labor and the specific types of labor. First, few forms of government interventions 
influence overall labor. However, empirical results show that the overall negative or zero effect 
on labor is quite misleading. By estimating the effects of environmental enforcement on different 
types of employment, the analysis finds several significant effects. First, state inspections in 
specific and general deterrence form, federal inspections in specific deterrence form, and 




 Although this result is not seen for statistically significant interventions, the signs of the 
coefficient estimates almost exclusively represent this theoretical finding. 
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informal enforcement action-related specific deterrence do not affect either labor type, or overall 
labor. Thus, these interventions do not affect labor at all. Next, federal inspection and monetary 
penalty-related general deterrence positively affects environmental workers. However, these 
interventions have no effect on production workers or overall labor. Informal enforcement 
actions in general deterrence form negatively affect environmental employees, but do not affect 
production employees or overall employees. Finally, the negative effect of specific deterrence-
related monetary fines results in a negative effect on overall facility-level employment. Together, 
these results show that although estimation of government interventions on overall employment 
shows minimal employment effects, labor effects do occur depending on the type of labor 
employed. 
 Finally, this sub-section assesses the robustness of the results presented in Tables 3.2 and 
3.3 by examining the three model specifications presented. The coefficient estimates support 
conclusions that are robust to the choice of model specification for all government intervention 
measures, outside of the parsimonious model. Since the local community characteristics 
significantly affect the number of environmental workers, Model 3 dominates Models 1 and 2. 
Thus, my focus on Model 3 as the primary model seems warranted. Thus, the lack of complete 
robustness across the three models seems inconsequential. 
3.7.5 Tests of Cross Equation Restrictions 
 The joint estimation of equations (3.6) and (3.7) offers the ability to test properly cross 
equation restrictions. This testing is important because any examination of overall labor 
implicitly imposes the restriction that each regressor equally affects environmental workers and 
production workers. This study converts these restrictions into hypotheses to test. Specifically, 
the analysis explores hypotheses comparing the effect of each particular government intervention 
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on the two types of labor. With these hypotheses in mind, this sub-section tests whether or not a 
particular government intervention coefficient from one equation equals its counterpart from the 
other equation. By testing the null hypothesis that the two slope coefficients in each pair of 
related terms are equal, the analysis determines whether the effect of each government 
intervention differs between the two types of labor. For example, by testing the null hypothesis 
that α3 = β3, the analysis assesses whether or not federal inspection-related general deterrence 
impacts environmental employees and production employees equally. Table 3.4 displays the test 
results. The results reveal that several pairs contain slope coefficients that statistically differ. 
Federal inspections, informal enforcement actions, and monetary fines in general deterrence 
form differently affect the two types of labor – environmental and production. These results 
show that managers do not take the same actions for each type of employee after receiving an 
intervention. For example, a federal inspection at a facility similar to one’s own facility prompts 
a manager to increase the allocation of environmental labor, but does not cause the manager to 
change the allocation of production labor. These results again highlight the misleading nature of 
the overall labor effects of government interventions by masking the countervailing effects of 
government interventions on the two labor types. 
 Next, Table 3.5 shows the tests of cross equation restrictions of joint significance of the 
government interventions. Again using federal inspections in general deterrence form as an 
example, by testing the null hypothesis that α3 = β3 = 0, the analysis is able to determine whether 
federal inspections significantly impact labor decisions at the facility in any way. Whereas a test 
of the coefficient in the overall labor estimation would show no significance for seven of the 
eight intervention measures, performing this test across the jointly estimated equations allows the 
analysis a deeper look at the labor decisions made by managers. Table 3.5 shows that federal 
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inspections, informal enforcement actions, and monetary penalties in general deterrence forms 
reject the null hypothesis that jointly, the interventions are equal to zero. The results reveal that 
although the effects of government interventions on overall labor may remain unseen, there are 
indeed management decisions made to alter labor in various forms. 
3.8 Conclusions 
This study delves into the employment effects of environmental regulation, specifically 
its enforcement, on chemical manufacturing facilities regulated under the Clean Water Act over 
the years 1999 to 2001. An important and growing economic literature examines the employment 
effects stemming from the imposition of environmental regulation. However, this literature fails 
to account for the differences among employment types when examining these effects. To 
contribute to this literature, this study jointly estimates a system of equations to assess the effects 
of environmental regulation on environmental and production employees separately. Moreover, 
the existing literature examines only the employment effects of regulation imposition. This study 
further contributes by examining the enforcement of environmental regulation. The labor impacts 
of environmental enforcement are especially important since environmental agencies allocate 
considerable resources to ensure adherence with regulations after they have been imposed on 
facilities because regulation without adherence is useless. 
Empirical results show that the overall facility-level employment effects of government 
interventions are almost all statistically zero. As the single exception, monetary penalties in 
specific deterrence form have a negative effect on overall employment. This set of findings is 
consistent with the literature, where all studies find a statistically negative or zero effect of 
regulation on employment. However, results from the joint estimation of environmental labor 
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and production labor as separate outcomes within a system of equations show that a number of 
government interventions affect environmental and production labor differently.  
These results offer policy implications. They support the claim that environmental 
regulation can indeed increase labor in one regard. Further, when regulatory agencies take 
enforcement action against regulated facilities, managers respond by changing the composition 
of the facility’s workforce. The overall result is negative in one case. 
While this study contributes much to the debate over environmental enforcement policy 
and its effects on labor, the need for future research remains. Future research should examine the 
allocation of labor versus that of other inputs, specifically environmental treatment capital. In 
addition, future studies should explore more sectors and more types of environmental media 















Table 3.1: Sample Summary Statistics 




    
Facility employees (FTE count) 259.9 480.9 1.850 
Environmental employees (FTE count) 6.23 14.91 2.373 
Production Employees (FTE count) 256.82 486.92 1.900 
    
Primary Regressors 
    
No. federal inspections / No. other facilities per region (1-yr lag) 0.029 0.050 1.754 
No. state inspections / No. other facilities per region (1-yr lag) 0.674 0.966 1.433 
No. federal inspections during preceding 24-month period 0.068 0.330 4.825 
No. state inspections during preceding 24-month period 1.491 2.472 1.658 
No. informal enforcement actions / No. other facilities per 0.077 0.190 2.477 
    region (1-yr lag)    
Penalty amount / No. other facilities per region (1-yr lag) 73.68 366.0 4.967 
No. informal enforcement actions during preceding 24-month period 0.200 1.168 5.840 
Penalty amount during preceding 24-month period 127.5 3,571 28.01 
    
Facility Characteristics 
    
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs. other chemicals) 0.437 0.496 1.135 
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs. other chemicals) 0.310 0.463 1.494 
Facility owned by publicly-held firm (vs. privately-held firm) 0.634 0.482 0.760 
Age of facility (years)    
Economic impact of facility: significant/great (vs. small/very little) 0.710 0.454 0.639 
Meeting with community leaders (vs. no meeting) 0.640 0.480 0.750 
Facility's environmental concern - environmental employees: 
     1=lowest, 10=highest 
8.896 1.331 0.150 
Facility’s attitudes toward inspection effectiveness:  
     effective (vs not effective) 
0.529 0.500 0.945 
Facility's attitudes toward monetary fine effectiveness: 
     effective (vs not effective) 
0.393 0.489 1.244 
    
County-level Community Characteristics 
    
Per capita personal income (2002 $) 28,833.4 7518.7 0.261 
Unemployment rate 4.650 1.418 0.305 
Wage and salary employment (# of jobs) 291,208 560,671 1.925 
Population density 866.6 1548.0 1.786 
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
 
Year/Region Controls 
    
EPA Region 1 (0,1) [regions 8, 9, 10 omitted] 0.034 0.180 5.357 
EPA Region 2 (0,1) [regions 8, 9, 10 omitted] 0.090 0.286 3.192 
EPA Region 3 (0,1) [regions 8, 9, 10 omitted] 0.131 0.337 2.573 
EPA Region 4 (0,1) [regions 8, 9, 10 omitted] 0.246 0.431 1.752 
EPA Region 5 (0,1) [regions 8, 9, 10 omitted] 0.164 0.371 2.262 
EPA Region 6 (0,1) [regions 8, 9, 10 omitted] 0.220 0.415 1.886 
EPA Region 7 (0,1) [regions 8, 9, 10 omitted] 0.067 0.250 3.720 




Table 3.2: Results from Between-Group Estimation of Total Facility-Level Employees 
    
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Primary Regressors 
    
No. federal inspections / No. other facilities per 
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Economic impact of facility: significant/great 





















Facility's attitudes toward inspection 






Facility's attitudes toward monetary fine 
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Table 3.2 (continued) 
 
County-Level Community Characteristics 
    
Per capita personal income (2002 $)   0.00002 
   (0.235) 
Unemployment rate   0.177 
   (0.042) 
Wage and salary employment (# of jobs)   0.0000002 
   (0.113) 
Population density   -0.00009 
   (0.133) 
    
Constant 4.31 2.84 1.65 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.109) 
    
Regional indicators included No Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 261 240 238 
    
 
Notes: 
p-values are shown in parentheses. 
Bold text identifies coefficients that are significant at 90% level or better (p ≤ 0.10). 

























Table 3.3: Results from Between-Group Joint Estimation of Environmental and 
Production Employees 
                   Model 1                Model 2    Model 3 













       
No. federal inspections / No. other 
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Facility Controls 
       






















Facility owned by publicly-held firm 










Age of the facility (years)   0.007 0.008 0.006 0.008 
   (0.096) (0.013) (0.132) (0.013) 
Economic impact of facility: 

































Facility's attitudes toward inspection 














Table 3.3 (continued) 
       
       
Facility's attitudes toward monetary fine 











       
County-Level Community Characteristics 
       
Per capita personal income (2002 $)     0.00003  
     (0.126)  
Unemployment rate     0.156  
     (0.090)  
Wage and salary employment (# of jobs)     0.00000009  
     (0.657)  
Population density     0.00003  
     (0.725)  
       
Constant -0.035 4.28 -4.17 2.81 -5.78 2.87 
 (0.811) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       











       
Number of Observations 252 252 234 234 232 232 
Regional indicators included No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
 
Notes: 
p-values are shown in parentheses. 
Bold text identifies coefficients that are significant at 90% level or better (p ≤ 0.10). 
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Table 3.4: Test of Cross Equation Restrictions: Test of Equal Slopes 




   
Specific Deterrence 
   
Federal inspections 0.28 0.596 
State inspections 0.98 0.323 
Informal enforcement actions 0.12 0.723 
Monetary fines ($) 2.39 0.122 
   
General Deterrence 
   
Federal inspections 9.56 0.002 
State inspections 0.96 0.326 
Informal enforcement actions 8.94 0.003 
Monetary fines ($) 4.87 0.027 




Table 3.5: Test of Cross Equation Restrictions: Joint Significance Test 




   
Specific Deterrence 
   
Federal inspections 1.26 0.531 
State inspections 1.03 0.598 
Informal enforcement actions 0.75 0.688 
Monetary fines ($) 4.26 0.119 
   
General Deterrence 
   
Federal inspections 9.56 0.008 
State inspections 2.73 0.255 
Informal enforcement actions 8.95 0.011 
Monetary fines ($) 5.09 0.079 
   
 
Notes:  
Tests performed after between-group joint estimation of environmental employees and 
production employees - specification equations 3.6 and 3.7, results in Table 3.3. 
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Appendix A: Robustness Checks – Chapter 1 
Table A.1: Results from Panel Estimation of Log-Environmental Employee Person-Month 






   
No. federal inspections / No. other 





No. state inspections / No. other facilities 

















No. informal enforcement actions / No. 





Penalty amount / No. other facilities per 





No. informal enforcement actions during 











   
Constant 2.835 2.528 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Observations 359 350 
Facility indicators included Yes Yes 
Year indicators included Yes Yes 
   
 
Notes: 
p-values are shown in parentheses. 
Bold text identifies coefficients that are significant at the 10 % level or better (p ≤ 0.10). 




Table A.2: Results from Panel Estimation of Log-Environmental Employee Person-Month 
Count by NPDES Facility Classification 
Independent Variable Minor facilities Major facilities 
   
No. federal inspections / No. other 





No. state inspections / No. other 





No. federal inspections during 











No. informal enforcement actions / No. 





Penalty amount / No. other facilities by 





No. informal enforcement actions 
during preceding 24-month period 
 -0.0198 
(0.036) 






   
Constant 2.213 3.481 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Observations 428 281 
Facility indicators included Yes Yes 
Year indicators included Yes Yes 
   
 
Notes: 
p-values are shown in parentheses. 
Bold text identifies coefficients that are significant at the 10 % level or better (p ≤ 0.10). 








Appendix B: First-Stage Estimation of Regulatory Approach Index – Chapter 
2 
Table B.1: First Stage Estimation of Regulatory Approach Index 
Independent Variable Coefficient 
  
State primacy (time in days) 0.006 
 (0.000) 
State primacy (vs. none) -1.522 
 (0.000) 












Facility employees (count) 0.0002 
 (0.009) 




Economic impact of facility: 
significant/great (vs. small/very little) 
0.0557 
(0.681) 
Facility's attitudes toward inspection 




Facility's attitudes toward monetary fine 












No. federal inspections / No. other facilities 
per region (1-yr lag) 
2.112 
(0.078) 
No. state inspections / No. other facilities 
per region (1-yr lag) 
-0.041 
(0.275) 








No. informal enforcement actions (count) / 






Table B.1 (continued) 
  
  
Penalty amount ($) / No. other facilities per 
region (1-yr lag) 
-0.000004 
(0.920) 
No. informal enforcement actions (count) 
during preceding 24-month period 
0.018 
(0.462) 










Partial F-test of Relevant Instruments – 




Year indicators included Yes 




p-values are shown in parentheses. 
Bold text identifies coefficients that are significant at 90% level or better (p ≤ 0.10). 















Appendix C: Derivation of Results for Hypothesis H2 – Chapter 3 
To solve the firm’s maximization problem, I assume homogeneity of the environmental 
product created among firms. Thus, all firms choose to achieve compliance at the level of ?̅?, and 
b in the maximization problem is set to one. Further, since p is the price of the good, this value 
must be > 0. 






− 2𝐿 − 2𝐸 = 0 
0 = 2L2 + 2EL – p 
𝐿 =

















Appendix D: Alternate Estimation Tables – Chapter 3 
Table D.1: Results from Panel Estimation of Total Facility-Level Employees 
 
Independent Variable 







   
No. federal inspections / No. other facilities 





No. state inspections / No. other facilities per 

















No. informal enforcement actions (count) / 





No. informal enforcement actions (count) 





Penalty amount ($) / No. other facilities per 











   
Constant 6.04 2.07 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Number of Observations 708 708 
Facility controls included Yes Yes 
Year indicators included Yes Yes 
Regional indicators included No Yes 
Facility indicators included Yes No 
   
 
Notes: 
p-values are shown in parentheses. 
Bold text identifies coefficients that are significant at 90% level or better (p ≤ 0.10). 





Table D.2: Results from OLS Estimation of Total Facility-level Employees (Pooled Data) 
  




No. federal inspections / No. other facilities per 
region (1-yr lag) 
-0.574 
(0.692) 
No. state inspections / No. other facilities per 
region (1-yr lag) 
0.121 
(0.310) 








No. informal enforcement actions (count) / No. 
other facilities per region (1-yr lag) 
0.538 
(0.063) 




Penalty amount ($) / No. other facilities per 
region (1-yr lag) 
0.00008 
(0.095) 








Number of Observations 708 
Facilities controls included Yes 




p-values are shown in parentheses. 
Bold text identifies coefficients that are significant at 90% level or better (p ≤ 0.10). 













Table D.3: Results from Separate Panel Estimations of Environmental and Production 
Employees 








   
No. federal inspections / No. other facilities 





No. state inspections / No. other facilities per 

















No. informal enforcement actions (count) / 





No. informal enforcement actions (count) 





Penalty amount ($) / No. other facilities per 











   
Constant -0.558 6.01 
 (0.408) (0.000) 
   
Number of Observations 679 679 
Facility controls included Yes Yes 
Year indicators included Yes Yes 
Facility indicators included Yes Yes 
   
 
Notes: 
p-values are shown in parentheses. 
Bold text identifies coefficients that are significant at 90% level or better (p ≤ 0.10). 
Standard errors are clustered at the facility level. 
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Table D.4: Results from Joint Random Effects Estimation of Environmental and 
Production Employees 
               Dependent Variable 





   
No. federal inspections / No. other facilities per 





No. state inspections / No. other facilities per 

















No. informal enforcement actions (count) / No. 





No. informal enforcement actions (count) 





Penalty amount ($) / No. other facilities per 











   
Number of Observations 673 682 
Facility controls included Yes Yes 
Community characteristic controls included Yes No 
Regional indicators included Yes Yes 
Year indicators included Yes Yes 
Facility indicators included No No 
   
 
Notes: 
p-values are shown in parentheses. 
Bold text identifies coefficients that are significant at 90% level or better (p ≤ 0.10). 











Table D.5: Results from Joint Estimation of Environmental and Production Employees 
(Pooled Data) 
              Dependent Variable 





   
No. federal inspections / No. other facilities per 





No. state inspections / No. other facilities per 

















No. informal enforcement actions (count) / No. 





No. informal enforcement actions (count) 





Penalty amount ($) / No. other facilities per 
















   
Breusch-Pagan Test of Residual Independence 40.17 
(0.000) 
 
   
Number of Observations 673 673 
Facility controls included Yes Yes 
Community characteristic controls included Yes No 
Regional indicators included Yes Yes 
   
 
Notes: 
p-values are shown in parentheses. 
Bold text identifies coefficients that are significant at 90% level or better (p ≤ 0.10). 
